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Essential interactionism

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Essential interactionism

On the intelligibility of prejudice

Allahabad(U.P.)

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For Robert Boguslaw, Margaret Lee and
Richard H. Popkin, who let me learn

The Dutchman's not the kind of man to keep his
thumb jammed in the dam that holds his dreams in.
But that's a secret that only Margaret knows.

Steve Goodman

Considerations of simplicity, power and precision,
scope and selectivity, familiarity and freshness,
are all relevant and often contend with one
another; their weighting is relative to our interests,
our information, and our inquiry.

Nelson Goodman

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A major project in this book is to understand prejudice. Let me be brief but specific about the autobiographical bases of my value commitment to studying prejudice. I was raised Jewish in Roanoke, Virginia, an American town of 80,000 with a Deep South self-image, in a valley completely surrounded by the Blue Ridge Mountains and three hours by car from any other town of more than 20,000 population. Our home for much of my childhood was on what had been the grounds of a plantation. The Plantation House and Slaves' Quarters still exist three blocks from my parents' home.

Almost without exception, the only direct contact the social structure facilitated between blacks and whites consisted of black women serving as mammies or maids at white homes and their husbands and sons as custodial workers, or at lowest level positions within local businesses. From birth until sophomore year in high school the only blacks with whom I conversed for more than a couple of sentences were the family's maids. The maid's salary had reached $35 a week by the mid-1960s, and she worked about forty hours weekly for that salary, in addition to nearly an hour's commute each way on irregularly scheduled busses from 'colored town.' Not until I brought a Northern friend home from college did I realize that in other parts of the country middle-income families such as mine could not afford maids.

During the early years of the black civil rights movement, within my home I heard conflicting reports about prejudice. My maternal grandparents were from Selma, Alabama, where some of the family still lives. During the battles for voting rights in Selma, my parents received letters from a family member who expressed anti-black stereotypes and accusations of 'communist' influence in the civil rights movement. Simultaneously, my parents complained of Jews' exclusion from social affairs and neighborhoods in the South.

By the time I entered high school I had become a devotee of the civil rights movement, which was just gaining its full steam. I became editor of the high school newspaper, and wrote in support of public school integration. As a result, I was physically and verbally assaulted at the high school, excluded from social life there, and eggs and stones were thrown at my family's car and home. By the time I graduated, the school was still segregated.

As soon as I arrived at college in Chicago I was confronted with a dormitory in which the black students were demanding that they not be forced to room with whites; a state of affairs which thoroughly confused me. It was at that point that I began to read everything I could locate concerning prejudice.

I learned young and through first-hand experiences the destructiveness, complexities and contradictions of this phenomenon called prejudice. I do start with a value commitment to gain an

Introduction

This book suggests a solution to the dilemma of how to derive intelligibility of a social scientific phenomenon. Intelligibility has been derived in diverse ways by social scientists. Most customary approaches use commonsense, dictionary definitions, operationalization, or formal logic. Each is an attempt to make phenomena amenable to scientific discourse and is a response to the disarray of communication in social science. None of these customary approaches remain faithful, however, both to the social and scientific history of the phenomena and to the promotion of scientific discourse across theoretical and methodological boundaries.

Both the products and processes of science (Rudner, 1966: 8) are human actions. The products are human linguistic actions which result from processes of intellectual, social and other actions. Scientific literature is the reports of these actions. My proposal is to derive the intelligibility of a social scientific phenomenon by exploring the literature concerning that phenomenon, to study science as action.

We begin with some house-cleaning for sociological analysis and an underlying metaphysical assumption. Chapter 1 critiques causal analysis in order to indicate an alternative and more defensible basic relational concept for sociology: human interaction. The adequacy of this relational concept is argued through a survey of the social and philosophical history of causation and interaction, and through specific replies to the arguments of leading correlational causalists within sociology.

Consideration of symbolic interactionism emerges in light of my proposal that causal assumptions be replaced in large measure by interactionist assumptions. Symbolic interactionism is a leading interactionist sociology and very close to the sort of interactionism attempted throughout the remainder of the book. Chapter 2 takes a

part one

Ontological considerations

If social worlds were merely relative, that would be easy. If they were merely regular that would be easy. I find myself torn between a desire to savor humanity's myriad ways of being and to uncover how they are all the same. This makes my work difficult.

1 Causation and interaction

My concern in this chapter is that sociologists should make claims only for that which their research can actually reveal, with whatever degree of murkiness that entails. Certain causal assumptions have hindered allegiance to this maxim.

Critiques of causal sociology (in this chapter) and of rival interactionist positions (in the next) suggest the project of the essential interactionism proposed throughout the remainder of the book.

Infusing correlations with causation

The object of my critique is one notion of causation, an influential notion in sociology which we might call social-correlation causation.[1] Blalock (1964), Hirschi and Selvin (1967) and Hyman (1955) argue that correlations are causal when they meet these conditions: (1) they are statistically significant; (2) A produces a change in B; (3) A is prior to B; and (4) all other possible causal variables are held constant. Let us consider each condition.

1 A father of contemporary mainstream sociology is David Hume, who in the 1700s posited skepticism about concepts of causation in his *Treatise on Human Nature* but reiterated Sextus Empiricus's point (Bury, 1933: 337) that we must think in terms of causation. To resolve the contradiction Hume proposed that the closest we can get to causation is probability. 'The constant conjunction of objects determines their causation,' wrote Hume.

Of course, causal analysts recognize what Blalock calls 'the simple assertion that correlation does not prove causality (4).' To get around this problem, they take the other three circuitous routes listed above.

2 The route of recommending that 'X is a direct cause of Y if and only if a change in X produces a change in the mean value of Y' does

and effect, which depended upon notions of retribution. Cause was originally the wrong and effect the punishment, and the latter could only occur in reaction to the appearance of the former.

4 The fourth circuitous route attempted from correlation to causation has been a process of elimination.[3] This reasoning maintains that if one eliminates all other things with which *A* could be correlated, one can assume that *A*'s correlation with *B* is causal. Lundberg put it this way (1954: 20–1):

> cause is imputed to the independent variable or combination of variables when it shows a high probability-expectation in its concomitant variations with other factors or combination of factors, still other supposedly relevant conditions held constant.

This process of elimination argument was answered by MacIver (1942: 22):

> There are a vast number of situations in which, if you eat a poisoned dish, you die. Death is the normal, the common sequel. Other things being equal, you die. Here, then, is our formula – 'other things being equal' . . . It is a formula that admits of application only on the assumption of an invariant or static order . . . But where we are dealing with a phenomenon of change in a changing system – the typical problem of social causation – this device will no longer avail us.

Blalock's discussion surrounding his call for causation through elimination is illustrative of the increasing distance from observables necessary to support such an unsupportable argument. He tells us (1964: 16):

> Allowances for unknown causal variables that produce changes in the dependent variable thus make it possible to reconcile causal determinism with statistical laws.

In other words, Blalock asks us to seek causation empirically via statistics which entail invisible activities – after he has admitted that causation cannot be observed ('causal laws cannot be demonstrated empirically'). He then moves even further away from empirical grounding by adding that statistical formulations about such invisible causal variables (1964: 18) 'must involve definite assumptions about *how* the uncontrolled variables are operating.'

Both Hume and the causal sociologists believe that causation dominates the world and that the closest we can get to understanding causation is probability. They differ in that Hume chooses skepticism after his interactions with these beliefs, and the sociologists become dogmatists. Hume's conclusion is consequently a devastating critique of dogmatism (1888: 103):

retribution, and with it causation, in the hands of God. Throughout the Christian era, causation retained its status as a norm, but it became God's norm. It is not surprising, then, that many persons we now consider founders of natural science operated from an assumption of divine, not natural, causation. Galileo viewed nature as 'an executor of God's orders.' Kepler explained the motion of the planets as God 'proceeding in a mathematical way;' and Newton believed that everything is God, that the laws of nature are established by his will (Kelsen, 1945: Chapter VI). Indeed, Newton viewed the whole structure of human history as ordained in the Biblical prophecies. Along with Hartley and Priestley, Newton spent much time demonstrating that Biblical prophesies are correct. These authors argued convincingly and in great detail that such events as the fall of the Roman Empire and the dispersion of the Jews were predicted and occurred (Popkin, 1976).

Hume's writings mark the beginning of a rejection of causation as God's rule and its replacement with causation as science's rules. We no longer seek verification for God's prophecies, or the work of Dike (the goddess of retribution), but rather for scientists' experiments. Rather than seeking to live according to the way God's rules necessitate that we live, we live according to the way that our scientific laws necessitate.

Inhering in all of these varieties of causation is the concept of *action*. These various forms describe different sorts of action, and different agents accomplishing the actions. Pre-Hume the action was always normative, and the agents were various gods. Post-Hume the actors became less visible, but remained present none the less.

It may be that we cannot conceive of cause except as action. Thomas Reid (1788), first noted this when he said that our notion of cause and effect in nature is modeled on an analogy between the human experience of an agent and his action. Gasking (1955: 483), specified this analogy:

> The notion of causation is essentially connected with our manipulative techniques for producing results . . . A statement about the cause of something is very closely connected with a recipe for producing it or preventing it.

Von Wright (1971: Chapter II), demonstrates that only a concept of action permits us to go beyond Hume's declaration that we never view causation, only constant conjunction. We can envision causation within a conjunction only in those instances in which we satisfy ourselves that, by manipulating one factor, we bring it about that the other is (or is not) there. This is typically accomplished by removing A from the conjunction of AB and finding that B vanishes

depends upon interaction is finally to accept that social processes are dynamic and that conjunction is defined in terms of action.

What causal analysts consider effects, then, in terms of interaction analysts are events within interaction; typically events which occur at the end of a group of interactions (Blumer, 1969: 54):

> The reluctance, and indeed the failure, of social scientists and psychologists to pay attention to the formation of social action by the acting unit is astonishing in view of the fact that such formation is what actually goes on in empirical social life. This failure is an interesting example of scholars being committed to a collective view, in this instance a view that sees social action as product and that jumps to antecedent factors as explanatory causes . . . social action must be studied in terms of how it is formed; its formation is a very different matter from the "causes" of the social action and is not covered by any specification of such causes.

This refracts Empiricus's objection to causal assumptions on the grounds that the separation of cause and effect is empirically impossible (Bury, 1933: 339):

> It is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause before apprehending its effect as *its* effect; for we only recognize that it is causative of the effect when we apprehend the latter as effect. But we cannot either apprehend the effect of the Cause as *its* effect unless we apprehend the cause of the effect as *its* Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its Cause . . . the fallacy of this circular mode of reasoning proves both to be inconceivable . . .

Blalock's most often cited source in favor of causation is Bunge, who put our case beautifully (1959: 156):

> That causation is often a one-sided approximation to interaction is rather obvious in biology; and more so in social matters. Take sociopolitical ideologies: they grow in a given social and cultural matrix, they are effective solely to the extent to which they adapt themselves either to the prevailing social structure or to social movements engaged in attempting its modification; but besides being the children of objective social situations, ideologies may react back on the system of social relations in the midst of which they grow, helping either in the conservation or in the modification of the very conditions that had elicited their emergence . . . Despite the almost obvious fact that the various aspects of social life act upon one another, most sociological

> decisive) and that here everything is relative and nothing is absolute – this they never begin to see. Hegel has never existed for them.

Hegelian and Marxist thinking emphasizes laws, but they are conceived in a manner not unlike what I will call essential interactionism. For Hegel the idea of law is primarily that of intrinsic or necessary connection which can be grasped through specific methods of reflecting. This becomes translated in some Marxist writing as depending upon dialectical thinking of development through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. As will be seen in the following chapters, my call for essential interactionism accepts systematic modes of reflection in addition to the dialectical method. But the crucial point to be made now is that the dialectical assumption is not causalistic. 'Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain. Conversely Cause contains nothing which is not in its effect,' Hegel (1929: Vol. II) noted. He illustrated this with the case of rain which 'causes' dampness. The same water which is rain is dampness, and it is only by our convenient conventions of speaking that we can make the water at one time the cause and at the other the effect. 'The cause is no richer than the effect,' Hegel put it (1929: Vol. II). Hegelian and Marxist ideas of law rely upon necessary interactions which in the former are grounded conceptually or logically and in the latter are grounded historically.

These points can be demonstrated more clearly in relation to the foregoing discussion of the necessity for thinking in terms of action when talking about causation. As noted there, the 'visualization' occurring in causal thinking is that of manipulation of parts: 'If I change *A*, then *B* will change.' Such thinking boils down to inductive generalizations (predictions) established through observation, thought experiment or active experiment. Hegelian and most Marxist work does not predict in this way, but rather attempts understanding of the nature of the case at hand.[8]

Objections

This interactionist assumption may be disputed in at least four ways. First, it may be that action cannot be understood unless causation is already understood, given that a part of my argument holds that action emerges as the empirical aspect of causation. To this I would reply that action is what can be pointed to in conjunctions *regardless* of whether or not these conjunctions were originally labeled as causal. In addition, the history of causation can also be read as suggesting the possibility of radical change. Is the change from

actions into those activities which support and reproduce the routines we call 'structures.'[7]

Probably Boguslaw's (1965) concepts of established and emergent situations are the relevant ones for putting this third objection into perspective. In established situations of unidirectional action, it would make no sense to attempt to understand via interactionist assumptions. But since no situations remain established or arise already established, there is, within every 'established' situation, emergence. Within emergence one inevitably finds interactional relations.[8]

The fourth criticism of interactionism will require a radical revision in the way in which sociology has typically employed interactionist assumptions, and in large part the remainder of this volume is devoted to suggesting that revision.

This criticism was noted early by Sextus Empiricus (Bury, 1933: 337):

> if cause were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything and at random. Horses, for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies, and elephants of ants.

From before Empiricus's time to the present the major relational and deterministic concept has been causation. Equally true, however, is that during all of this time causation has been inadequate for these purposes. As Empiricus put it, 'A cause is no more existent than non-existent' (Bury, 1933: 343).

I have argued that interactionism can be empirically grounded and is a viable alternative relational concept to causation. But how can it deal with determinism: how can it explain why horses are not born of flies and elephants of ants? Some varieties of interactionism *cannot* deal with such questions, as the next chapter will indicate for forms of symbolic interactionism.

> any and every object – consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object.

Idealism has been throughout the recent history of thought an alternative to materialism, the doctrine that to understand the world one must understand the nature of objects apart from minds. The difficulty with choosing in every case to conduct inquiries from either idealistic or materialist assumptions is to ignore that both can be demonstrated faulty to some extent, just as both can 'prove' themselves. The case against strict materialism was most thoroughly presented by Hume, who demonstrated that all we directly experience is our mind. 'We have no perfect idea of anything but of a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance,' Hume wrote. But then, the materialist retort has pointed out that idealists are too certain of the validity of their perceptions, which may be the result of the material world in the first place and at the least are often changed by the world outside of oneself.

That both sides of the question have worth is also suggested by the vigor and dedication with which they are proposed throughout the history of thought. The pertinent and difficult question becomes one of determining how far to go with each, under which conditions, and in what manner.

To avoid confronting this issue by instead taking a firm side results in positions which can quite easily be demonstrated inadequate. For instance, when Blumer argues that 'the environment consists *only* of the objects that the given human beings recognize and know,' he falls into this kind of error. Whether or not a person knows she is amid bacteria or not, she may well become ill as a result of having interacted with them. Whether or not a German Jew recognized or knew Hitler, he was likely to become dead or harmed as a result of Hitler.

Blumer's out-of-hand idealism contradicts itself, even within single paragraphs (1969: 22):

> The traditional position of idealism is that the "world of reality" exists only in human experience and that it appears only in the form in which human beings 'see' that world. I think this position is incontestable . . . the empirical world can 'talk back' to our pictures of it or assertions about it – talk back in the sense of challenging and resisting, or not bending to, our images or conceptions of it.

If the worlds exist only in our experiences as we see them, what's doing the talking back to us?

within bounds. To make this clear, we need only exchange the locations of some of the items Blumer mentions. Although what he says about stars, marriages and presidents is true enough, can a star ever become a marriage, or a president a marriage, or a sheepherder a star, and so forth? Positions such as Blumer's have been termed 'mereological inessentialism' by Chisholm, who notes that such positions are manifestly absurd (1973: 584):

> This would be the view that, for any whole w, w could be made up of any two things whatever. For, given such a view, one could say, of *this table*, that it could have been made up of the number 36 and the property blue.

A sociological equivalent would be to say of capitalism that it could have been made up of equality and a non-competitive economy. The point to be made is that objects are determined by social processes within the bounds set by their essential natures.

The neglect of essentialism by Blumer also leads to a very inadequate way of dealing with interaction patterns which remain stable or which repeat themselves (1969: 18):

> We have to recognize that even in the case of pre-established and repetitive joint action each instance of such joint action is to be formed anew . . . Repetitive and stable joint action is just as much a result of an interpretative process as is a new form of joint action that is being developed for the first time.

Blumer ignores the feature of social life which J. L. Moreno (1953), appropriately termed 'cultural conserves.' Although it is often true that people decide which conserves to use, or whether or not to use conserves at all, this is the case only for some people under some circumstances. Moreno correctly noted that creativity and spontaneity are to be developed and trained, and that persons do not by any means act creatively from their capacities for spontaneity in all of their affairs. Persons sometimes use cultural conserves for conducting interpretive processes themselves and for negotiating what will become social facts. Indeed, repetitive and stable joint actions are characterized by the use of cultural conserves, and they are often best understood as such. To understand the everyday workings of a bureaucracy, for example, is to understand the repetitive processes at work repeating repetitive processes. The line workers who start 'interpreting' these are likely to find themselves fired for inefficiency or disrespect. The pertinent questions are why and how interpretative processes and cultural conserves exist in given periods and states.

Likewise, Blumer is wrong in a crucial respect when he extends his 'no fixed status' thesis to groups (1969: 19):

the labeling theorist investigates, or whatever the official version may be. Consequently labeling theorists have been criticized along these lines:

> it does not see deviance as deriving from specified master institutions of this larger society, or as expressing an active opposition to them (Gouldner, 1968: 107).

> writers of this field still do not try to relate the phenomenon of 'deviance' to larger social, historical, political, and economic interests. The emphasis is still on the 'deviant' and the 'problems' he presents to himself and others, not on the society within which he emerges and operates (Liazos, 1972: 104).

> by locating deviance in 'traditional' areas, labeling sociologists take the perspective of officials. They further take the perspective of officials by defining deviance as what officials perceive as deviance . . . (Warren and Johnson, 1972: 81).

Works such as *Wayward Puritans* (Erikson, 1966), and *Boys of Boise* (Gerassi, 1966), were largely labeling in their perspectives and concerned themselves with larger institutions and with labeling by persons other than officials. Nevertheless, labeling studies have tended to concentrate on traditional areas of deviance and upon official labeling (Warren and Johnson, 1972).

Concurrently, labeling theorists necessarily place great force in labels, and as their parent symbolic interactionism would dictate, they tend not to search for which types of power the label has, but to attach causal power to the label. Within labeling theory the label is still thought of as a cause and the resulting deviant behavior as an effect. It is interesting that this state of affairs could arise, in light of leading symbolic interactionists' cautions against causal analyses (e.g. Blumer, 1969: 57). But it is quite understandable that such a position continues, given that symbolic interactionism offers no more acceptable way for dealing with determinism.

In addition, labeling theorists do not recognize much of what inheres in labeling, largely as a result of their over emphasis on symbolism to the exclusion of essential features of interactions. Among the assumptions they have held without adequate support are the following: (1) that rules are enforced against only actual (or perceived) deviants; (2) that successful labeling effects only those labeled; and (3) that whether the label 'sticks' depends primarily on the interaction which occurs between the designated recipient of the label and those involved in the application. A difficulty with these positions was noted by Thio (1973: 7):

> when a small minority of powerless people are successfully

market structure, or even the essences of crime and alienation in the particular market. For all we know from the paper, the activities described may be flukes within a particular state of capitalism. This is evident in several ways. Most simply, the practices Farberman uncovered may disappear entirely within several months, and then his symbolic interactionist research serves no purpose beyond temporary description, and it would be necessary to go back to the field to find the new features every time things changed. Additionally, if one notes carefully Farberman's text, it is apparent that these practices were occurring, as far as the author can specify, at no more than 20 per cent of the agencies studied.

Farberman's paper clearly contains more explanatory power than would a study which correlated crimes with agencies or types of market structures (and would probably conclude that the relationship is 'insignificant'). It also gives us several ideas about the nature of crime within capitalism. But the paper does not reach the type of strong explanation which tells us, e.g. the necessity of crime as a defining characteristic of this market structure.

Mead

The purpose of this critique has been to introduce the importance of conducting essential analyses as part of interactionist research. This has been attempted through some criticisms of major practitioners of symbolic interactionism.

It should be noted, however, that the difficulties found among practicing symbolic interactionists do not necessarily inhere in the work of George Herbert Mead. Space does not permit an adequate analysis of Mead's work relating to these points; but let me offer a series of his statements to illustrate how they differ from some contemporary practices.[1]

Idealism Mead seems an idealist of a different sort than those noted above, if he can be classified as an idealist at all (1934: 122f and 188):

> The meanings of things or objects are actual inherent properties or qualities of them; the locus of any given meaning is in the thing which, as we say, 'has it'.

(This is an excellent statement for the importance of conducting inquiries into essences.)

> I want to avoid the implication that the individual is taking something that is objective and making it subjective. There is an actual process of living together on the part of all members of the

described as processes made up of phenomena within various events, which at each point make up states amid other states.[2] Causal (correlational) analysis locates particular local states, taking phenomena for granted. For instance, correlational analysts have examined the conjunctions of frustration, race, socio-economic position, educational attainment, marginality, etc. with prejudice. In so doing, they take these phenomena for granted and do not study them in-themselves, but rather construct operational definitions of the terms being correlated, in order to concentrate on the direction, type and magnitude of the conjunctions. On the other hand, from their idealism, emphasis on verbal symbols, and indeterminism, symbolic interactionists underemphasize phenomena. This was dramatized for the author when one of America's best-known symbolic interactionists informed him in a private conversation, 'You cannot study prejudice, only settings and symbols in which prejudice exists.'

Both correlational analysis and symbolic interactionism assume implicity that we already know about the phenomena which the former finds constantly conjoined and which the latter finds within events. But it is impossible to learn about a phenomenon itself by seeing only how it interacts with other phenomena. We also require understanding of phenomena themselves—of their composition and possibilities. To do this we must look for the essential make-up of phenomena, and hence I call the enterprise essential interactionism. This endeavor is a systematic attempt to accomplish the old ontological dictum that 'the knowledge of possibilities must precede that of actualities.'

An appreciation of the need for essential interactionism sheds some light on why so much theorizing based primarily upon correlational analysis is so easily replaceable. Thus, the history of social science theories concerning prejudice reveals that a new theory of prejudice develops every time prejudice manifests itself in a slightly different manner from its previous exhibition. Through an essentialist understanding of prejudice we can hope to avoid this syndrome of dealing solely with manifestations of a phenomenon rather than with the phenomenon itself. Through essential interactionism we can see that what we find at the moment to be 'the real social world' is only a special case of possible social worlds.[3]

part two

Method

Customary 'how to' manuals are usually insulting, but wise 'how to' manuals seldom teach how to.

Introduction

This Part will propose a strategy for essential interactionist research into pervasive social phenomena which have been widely studied by other types of researchers in the past. Part III will then apply this strategy to the social phenomenon of prejudice.

Clearly this is not the only sort of research which can or should be conducted by essential interactionists, and I trust that methodological strategies for other sociological concerns will be developed.[1] Chapter 3 is intended to be useful for such future methods for essential interactionism as well as for development of the immediate methodological strategies. The chapter is devoted to general and impressionistic discussions of some major entities and procedures which seem important for any sort of essential interactionist methodology.

Chapter 4 translates the general concerns into a strategy for conducting research upon large bodies of material from previous (not essential interactionist) researchers. The goal will be to offer a strategy for producing grounded theory from these desperate and often conflicting earlier works, to re-utilize literature.

This strategy for essential interactionism is finally a methodological heuristic. Parallel efforts include C. Taylor's (1971), attempt to determine intersubjective assumptions within a pattern of social practice; etymological studies of social scientific concepts; and development of a formal lexicon for social science based upon rules for the admission of primitives into a system (thus far an unpublished effort by Professors Richard H. Rudner, Robert Wolfson and Robert Barrett).

The project of the present book owes its intellectual allegiances primarily to Aristotelian and Husserlian notions of essences as those elements without which the phenomenon cannot be imagined. We do not concern ourselves with ontological problems

3 General considerations

Once one's goal becomes that of describing the essences of something there are few places to turn for methodology. As we have seen both causal and interactionist methodologists have taken for granted social phenomena and their compositions. A movement within Western thought which has concentrated, in contrast, upon internal understanding of phenomena has been phenomenology, and for this reason I have turned especially to phenomenology in developing this method for essential interactionism.

Although the term phenomenology was used as early as 1765 and appears several times in Kant's writings, it did not obtain a technical meaning or come to be practised until Hegel. Hegel's concern was essentially that of reaching Absolute Mind, or as he phrased it, *Phenomenology of Mind*. Some of the preceding and some of the following discussions rely upon Hegel's insights. However, when contemporaries speak about phenomenology, the central figure is Edmund Husserl, who formally laid out what phenomenology would look like in practice and conducted a variety of phenomenological inquiries into consciousness and into phenomenology itself.[1]

Within sociology, phenomenology has a long history. In addition to having its impact on others' sociologies (notably that of Georges Gurvitch), early phenomenological sociologists produced complete works of their own. Among these are Alfred Vierkandt's *Natural and Cultural Peoples* (1895), and *Theory of Society* (1922), and Theodor Litt's *Individual and Society* (1919). At present phenomenological sociology is usually associated with the work of Alfred Schutz and those who have been influenced by his work (e.g. Harold Garfinkel). These movements have been concerned almost exclusively with investigating meaning in order to understand social life.

these considerations derive directly from Husserlian phenomenology, but thinkers as possibly distant from Husserl as Nelson Goodman, Aristotle, and Marx will play significant roles in the development of these methods.

Expanding empiricism

A major goal of essential interactionism is to provide an expanded empiricism. To sociologists who have been blinded by correlational empiricism and have come to believe that it is the only possible variety, a proposed expansion of empiricism may seem at first a proposal to *abandon* empiricism. Actually the thrust of phenomenological analysis throughout its history has been a two-fold strategy for refining empiricism. The negative side of this strategy consists of turning away from crystallized beliefs and theories handed down by tradition, in J. L. Moreno's terms, away from 'cultural conserves' of the sciences and social sciences. This means a scrupulous identification and deliberate elimination of existing constructs in order to return to the phenomenon itself. Such an emancipation from preconceptions is a very difficult matter indeed, as will be made clear in the chapters describing specific strategies for accomplishing this feat. A complete accomplishment of the task is impossible, of course, and this is recognized even before a strategy is presented. But this impossibility is built into the strategy and partially ovecome by way of a constant meta analysis procedure.

The positive side of phenomenology's strategy for refined empiricism consists of its own ways of turning back toward the phenomenon in order to investigate it in particular, its general essence, the essential relationships among essences, its modes of appearing, its constitution in consciousness and in the lifeworld, and its meaning (Spiegelberg, 1965: 656–9).

Traditional empiricism takes for granted that a small group of experience types (usually experimentation and correlation) are appropriate for investigating all types of phenomena. In contrast, a phenomenologically directed empiricism tries to determine the appropriate use of appropriate methods according to the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and the nature of the methods (*Ideas*, 78):

> If by *Positivism* we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on what is 'positive,' i.e., on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is *we* who are the genuine positivists. In fact we permit *no* authority to deprive us of the right of recognizing all kinds of intuition as equally valuable

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original researcher (1970b, Section 34). It therefore becomes crucial that we be especially careful about our intuitions in any inquiry, at least as careful as about the second order uses to which we put them.

How subjective is phenomenology?

The talk above (and throughout Husserl's *Crisis*) of objective reality may make phenomenology sound totally subjectivistic. Introductory sociology texts refer to phenomenology as subjectivism. Actually, Husserl never denies objective reality, though he does take a critical look at previous notions of objectivity (1962: 14) and (1970b: 96):

> Our phenomenological idealism does not deny the positive existence of the real world and of Nature – in the first place as though it held it to be an illusion. Its sole task and service is to clarify the meaning of this world, the precise sense in which everyone accepts it, and with undeniable right, as really existing.
>
> What is, in respect to sense and validity, the 'objective world,' objectively true being, and also the objective truth of science, once we have seen universally with Hume (and in respect to nature even with Berkeley) that 'world' is a validity which has sprung up within subjectivity, indeed – speaking from my point of view, who am now philosophizing – one which has sprung up within *my* subjectivity, with all the content it ever counts as having for me?

Probably the clearest notion of the Husserlian position on the subjective-objective question is Spiegelberg's (1973), which holds that phenomenology's type of subjectivity is that of *subject-related*. This usage is rather different from the two more common usages: the merely personal (varying from person to person); and dependent upon a subject (without a subject objects cannot exist). Subject-related suggests the interwoven nature of the subjective-objective 'split,' and is well compared to an image in a mirror, which is dependent upon the subject but also upon the object.

One who reads bits and pieces of Husserl's work is not likely to find such a clear usage of subjectivity and objectivity, however, because this weaving of the two poles was a lifetime dialectic for Husserl. In his earlier works, the focus was upon ways in which we conceive the objective world. This continues in the *Crisis* as well, but in new ways. History becomes important in *Crisis* as Husserl traces the conversion in Greece of notions of 'knowledge' and 'truth' into those of 'objective truth,' which in the modern period

himself to talking about ideality or to opposing essences to the 'this-here.' He considers it inadequate to raise the individual phenomenon to the general or to the ideal.[8] Rather, in the determinations of the phenomenon there is seen to be a hierarchy which has its own grades of clearness. In other words, the essences of a phenomenon are its necessary and immutable structure, not its ideal or general structure. The essences are what make the phenomenon what it is. The search for essences therefore becomes a kind of meta-empiricism: a search for that which is the principle of the phenomenon beneath its everyday properties.

A clear but simple example of these points about essences can be seen with the concept of sound. In order for a sound to have a determined intensity, timbre and pitch, it must possess the essences timbre, intensity and pitch. An essential interactionism would seek to specify these essences.

It may also be useful in this general introduction to put essences (and essential interactionism) into non-Husserlian terms. Within the history of Western philosophy, essentialism is usually traced to Aristotle, and defined as by Quine (1966b: 173):

> Aristotelian essentialism. This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing and others accidental.

Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* defines science in terms of this essentialism (90b):

> Scientific knowledge is judgment about things that are universal and necessary, that the conclusions of demonstration and all scientific knowledge follow from the first principles.

Probably the most serious deficiency in Aristotle's essentialism from our view is his fusion of necessity and sufficiency. He ends up equating attributes whose retention is sufficient and those whose retention is necessary, to keep a thing in existence (N. White, 1973). Our own concern is to locate these necessary attributes and their essential configurations, and through an understanding of these to offer insights into the possibilities as well for the other (e.g. sufficient) attributes within the total phenomenon.

Some distinctions by N. Goodman (1951), also help place our discussion in perspective. Goodman notes first a distinction between phenomenalistic systems, which deal with what he calls qualia (qualitative elements), and physicalistic systems, which deal with things, processes, etc. In both cases, one employs perceptible individuals for achieving the analyses. Our research for essences is much like a search for qualia, and therefore within what Goodman

(*Crisis*, 139), 'the lifeworld does have, in all its relative features, a *general structure*. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible to all.'

But these arguments against essences can be dismissed more directly. Those who argue against essences must rely upon essences. Symbolic interactionists find symbols and interactions to be the essences of social life. Similarly, functionalists find the organic analogy to be an essence of social life. Both admit to essences implicitedly, while rejecting them explicitedly. As Paul Simon put it during his *Live Rhymin'* concert: 'After changes upon changes we are more or less the same.'

A related objection is that essences are 'merely concepts.' This objection holds that many different concepts can be identified as essences of a phenomenon, and that consequently essences are merely concepts. But such a critique ignores the point at issue. Certainly, of the number One I can have many concepts: O-n-e, U-n-o, An Apple, 1 . . . And these are 'mere concepts.' But behind them is the essence of One or the essences of One, to be determined through systematic investigations of necessary and immutable properties of One, which none of the above would fit (i.e. spelling varies according to language, an example is not a number, etc.).

Santayana answered these relativistic criticisms in a couple of separate ways (1927: 23 and 66):

> Essence so understood much more truly *is* than any substance or experience or any event: for a substance, event or experience may change its form or may exist only by changing it, so that all sorts of things that are proper to it in one phase will be absent from it in another. It will not be a unit at all, save by external delimitation . . . Essence is just that character which any existence wears in so far as it remains identical with itself and so long as it does so . . .

> By one of the uses or abuses of the word *is*, one thing is often said to be another. This absurdity (as a pure logician might think of it) flows out of the natural relation of essences with things and serves clumsily to express it. A thing naturally has many appearances – lights, sounds, temperatures, perspectives; and it may conventionally have many names. Each of these essences, as it crosses the field of intuition, is verbally identified with that thing; but good sense, unless a sophistical attempt at accuracy trips up its honest intentions, will easily see that none of these names or appearances *is* the existing thing . . .

common sense or vulgar objects, each of them is constituted by a nonvulgar primary object.

Essences in other inquiry strategies

> Blindness to ideas is a kind of psychic blindness, which through prejudices renders us incapable of bringing into the field of judgment what we have already in our field of intuition. Our critics in truth see, and so to speak continuously see, 'ideas,' 'essences' – make use of them in thought, formulate judgments concerning essences – only from their epistemological 'standpoints' they explain the same away. Self-evident data are patient, they let theories chatter about them, but remain what they are (*Ideas*, 80).

The earlier chapter on causation noted the dependence of causal analysts upon action. And a few pages back we noted some essences of symbolic interactionism and functionalism. Similarly, it can be seen in a more general way that inquiries which do not concern themselves with essences must depend upon essences.

The most general sense in which this is true is that noted by Husserl, that physical scientists take the world of everyday life as the 'forgotten sense foundation of physical science' (*Crisis*, 48). Husserl illustrates the importance of this point in several examples concerning Galileo's, Einstein's and Michelson's works. Thus, when Einstein repeats Michelson's experiments in his laboratory with instruments copied from those of Michelson, he takes for granted what these instruments are, what instruments are used for by humans generally, what a laboratory is, etc. All of this is based on his uncritical acceptance of aspects of the everyday world around him. We may wish to consider this acceptable for Einsteinian method, but we *cannot* consider his conclusions as grounded anywhere but in this everyday world that he accepts uncritically. (On the other hand, Einstein and the others are considered great contributors to human knowledge because so often they *do* place the commonsense assumptions in doubt; to develop new instruments, theories, etc.)

Husserl also notes this importance of taken-for-granted essences in his discussions of mathematics (throughout *Crisis*, notably Part II). As he puts it, (53), 'For in spite of all that is new (in modern physics), what is essential in principle, it seems to me, remains: namely, nature, which is in itself mathematical; it is given in formulae, and it can be interpreted only in terms of the formulae.' In Husserl's view what has made the great progress of modern physics possible is that Galileo, through systematic reduction,

4 Literature as sites

The method to be proposed in this chapter consists of a search for essences of interactions through other persons, of what Herbert Spiegelberg (1964) has named 'phenomenology through vicarious experience.' Such an investigation attempts an intersubjective appreciation of others' understandings of the phenomenon in order to develop and ground proposed essences.

Vicarious phenomenology

Phenomenology is customarily interpreted as the direct study of phenomena as given to the phenomenologist. Is it not true, then, that by attempting phenomenology through vicarious experience essential interactionism abandons the original project of phenomenology?

Perhaps the most accurate answer is that we do not abandon the original project any more than did Husserl himself. Husserl makes marvelous use of historical material for his own final work, the *Crisis*. More generally, in his meditations on the problem of intersubjectivity Husserl was unable finally to decide whether phenomenology has adequate direct access to others and their worlds or whether they are only indirectly presented by what is directly given (Spiegelberg, 1964). Husserl confronts these questions in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations* and in some material in *Husserliana I* (trans. Cairns, 1960). At some points he contends that the other person stands before us directly (1960: 124):

> What we really see is not a sign nor a mere analogon or in any ordinary sense a likeness . . . The other is seized in real originality.

through vicarious experience. The first is through fieldwork with persons who have experienced the phenomenon and been a part of it in various ways, eliciting understanding of the phenomenon in order to attempt to determine for oneself the essences of the phenomenon. Such a strategy would employ the traditional fieldwork methods, such as participant observations, interviewing, role-playing, etc. within a group or groups the researcher can adequately contend experience the phenomenon in its only forms. For example, to study the essences of homosexuality one might want to determine the variety of gay groups (closet, open, bar going, 'friendship group,' etc.) and enter these as a participant observer.

In many cases of essential interactionist research, however, such a strategy will not offer the researcher as many angles for examining the phenomenon as would another strategy. Where one is dealing with a large social phenomenon, which exists in a myriad of groups, historical times, and locations, a different type of research site may prove more appropriate. These sites consist of previous research concerning the phenomenon in question. As Glaser and Strauss (1967: 163), note:

> There are some striking similarities – sometimes obvious although often overlooked – between fieldwork and library research. When someone stands in the library stacks, he is, metaphorically, surrounded by voices begging to be heard. Every book, every magazine article, represents at least one person who is equivalent to the anthropologists' informant or the sociologists' interviewee. In those publications, people converse, announce positions, argue with a range of eloquence, and describe events or scenes in ways entirely comparable to what is seen or heard during field work.

Although this methodology is mentioned by Glaser and Strauss, its potential has not been explored beyond their initial descriptions, neither theoretically nor in actual fieldwork. Part III of the present work explicitly will consider previous research as the fieldwork sites. Proceeding from this assumption, qualitative fieldwork among these researchers will be undertaken, much in the traditional fashion (summarized by Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Wax, 1971; Filstead, 1970; and others.)

Several important comparisons and contrasts are necessary between traditional fieldwork sites and the prejudice literature sites.

The prejudice literature sites differ from many traditional sites in that what is being attempted by social actors at the site is the handling of a single phenomenon: in this case prejudice. This contrasts markedly with such sites as street corners, bars, and

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the observer's framework,' or 'glosses managed in terms of the interpretive procedures of the sociologist' (Walsh, 1972: 27).

To say the above is to say that the literature sites exhibit a specific variation of a common fieldwork problem. Sites are seldom if ever constructed with the fieldworker in mind. They are built by the participants, for the participants' own needs, upon the participants' own customs and languages. These features obligate the fieldworker to constantly translate back and forth among languages and to expect varieties of fabrications from participants' accounts. In the case of literature sites, however, one is usually unable to use such fieldwork methods as observing how persons talk about the same topic among a variety of listeners, or asking a question again at a later time or in a different way.

Other good methods exist for dealing with the above problems, however. Careful fieldworkers come to expect people to tell lies or to offer partisan accounts for good reasons. The statement of individual participants can be further checked through comparisons with others at the sites, through observations of other activities at the sites, and through phantasy variations (described later in this chapter).

Importance of literature sites inquiry

Phenomenology has often been mistaken by practitioners and critics alike for a new version of simple subjectivism. We noted in the last chapter that this danger exists within phenomenology, but that it can and should be avoided through a subject-relatedness. In the specific case of essential interactionist inquiries into large social phenomena, research into literature sites is a strategy for combatting these dangers and for maximizing the angles available for locating essences.

Most basically, the literature sites inquiry is a recognition and use of others' honest attempts to understand prejudice and of the current researcher's own inability to view the phenomenon from all of the many times in which it has existed, or 'through the eyes' of the many who have participated and observed it. Such an appreciation or use would not at all conflict with Husserl's own intention for phenomenology. Husserl emphasizes in the *Crisis* (Section 54), the importance not only of others' perceptions and existences, but of the reality that the 'I' is an I among many I's, which constitute 'all of us' among whom I am but one 'I'. Given this situation, the 'all of us' or the 'many I's' became for Husserl inevitably interwoven in each individual 'I.'

Further, we have all had experiences of turning other I's into I-myself. When we think about ourselves at some point in the past

Choosing sites

A problem which may seem monstrous for inquiries into literature sites as large as that concerning prejudice is the choice of sites for doing one's fieldwork. It would be impossible to spend long periods of time on the several thousand books and papers which have been written concerning prejudice. The problem is no larger, however, than with most traditional fieldwork projects, if we are honest about these other projects. If one wishes to study alcohol treatment facilities through fieldwork, one requires neither a visit to every center nor a random sample of centers, but rather an understanding of the types of centers which exist and adequate fieldwork in representative centers.[3]

Wherever one begins research, what becomes important is to gain from the participants themselves a conception of the sites available and what distinguishes them, and then to encourage oneself to go to those sites which would seem likely to offer an understanding of problems one is investigating.

We can posit that an early 'step' for essential interactionist fieldwork at literature sites is to determine from informants which sites exist, and how they are distinguished from one another. In practice this means extensive use of card catalogs, book indices, periodical indices, literature guides, etc. Such a search takes the form of a spiral, with the first book's references employed to lead the fieldworker to others, whose references are also used. Quick visits ('skimming') must then be employed to determine into which groups the various individual sites fall, both according to the description of their group memberships and others' descriptions. Such divisions tend to run according to theories, and debates within theories.

After this point, one may choose either of two options: (1) going to one site and letting possible essences emerge, then investigating them further at other sites; or (2) attempting to visit those sites that participants consider representative of each group. The inability at this point to know which informants to trust concerning representativeness of sites indicates that (2) may lead to mistaken assumptions from the beginning, and assumptions which may be hard to revise once one is locked into these sites and becoming an insider. This strategy may also result in only cursory acquaintance with many sites, rather than depth understanding of any single site. But (1) has pitfalls as well. The fieldworker may build into the research the impossibility of investigating entire groups of sites (i.e. if the essences found in the first site are very distant from those one would have found at other sites).[4]

My own attempted solution will be to visit representative sites

fieldworker studying gay bars may defensibly limit his observations to 'the back room with the stage and chairs' when the topic is drag shows. The site may be even further reduced to one row of seats when the topic is 'straights' reactions to drag shows. Yet the site may later become a surburban home when the topic is 'drag show straights' at home, and this site may be abandoned after additional fieldwork, in favor of those homes scattered throughout a metropolitan area which the fieldworker has determined to be connected by telephone conversations.

A literature site may be the report of a single study exploring the substantive question at hand, and this site may be replaced or expanded in favor of a dozen studies separated in time or space but all dealing with the same topic. For example, the Sherif (1966), study of intergroup prejudice at a summer camp may be examined as a site unto itself concerning the process of change from friendship-with to prejudice-against, since Sherif's summer camp environment uniquely produced this change. In looking at the question of group norms, however, the Sherif site would be only one area among many within the site, which would include several other areas where group norms have been central concerns.

Or the boundaries of a literature site may be determined not by substantive questions, but by theory or method. Theories or methods may themselves offer essences of a phenomenon, quite apart from the substantive issues they share with other theories or methods. Thus, one might take conflict theory (as developed by Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1958; and James, 1968), in its richness, perhaps even to the exclusion of its believers' specific works on prejudice. The goal would be to see if essential interactionist analysis performed on this social theory offers essences of the specific social phenomenon in question. Among the questions which might arise from this inquiry are: Is conflict inevitable? If so, is it not possible that prejudice is also inevitable, as the necessary attitude nexus for conflict? What about the dispute between functionalist conflict theorists and Marxist conflict theorists – is prejudice system-supportive, system-destructive, neither, both?

An example of a method as a site would be consideration of those studies which request subjects to answer questions about target groups on the basis of feelings scored from one to ten. One might ignore the actual questions asked during these studies and concentrate upon the response patterns. Do the subjects tend to respond to each question far to the lower end of the scale, far to the upper end, far to both ends, towards the middle? Does a clear response pattern indicate the direction of prejudice? Does the response pattern reveal the method of prejudice (e.g. negative end tendencies, dichotomous thinking, neutral opinions)?

unaffecting, or affecting in ways the musician or audience did not intend. The classical musician when successful performs the prescribed piece as it is intended, with just enough changes to distinguish him from other players. When unsuccessful, the classical product is very different from its presentation in the past. The advantage to the former strategy is that one has more freedom: of discovery, of what to do with the product, etc. The advantage of the latter is that one knows in advance pretty well what one is going to get for one's time and money (Bledsoe, 1975).

Two types of constant comparisons can be distinguished, both within Husserl's work and within the work of sociologists who follow Glaser and Strauss (e.g. Hadden and Lester, 1976). The first is horizontal (synchronic), as Husserl employed in his earlier works such as *Logical Investigations*. Horizontal comparisons treat material as it presents itself to the investigator at the present moment. The second type, vertical comparisons, treats the material as existing at a variety of times, as having a history. The vertical method is sometimes called genetic phenomenology, and is evidenced by Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry' in the *Crisis*, in which he retraces the conceptual decisions and turning points made by geometers (Levin, 1975: 74).

For our purposes, the horizontal constant comparative method will be employed by taking the essence which has been suggested to the fieldworker and seeing if it exists at other literature sites when the phenomenon under investigation exists. If in fact we have discovered an essence, it should exist at all of the sites in some form (it should exhibit immutability).

For vertical comparisons we take an essence to the various sites and try to observe how it arose. Through this attempt to untie the knots of conceptual decisions, vertical comparisons offer fresh information about the phenomenon by showing the ancestral concepts as decisions, and as resolutions to webs of experience. We thereby reactivate these webs to see the numerous alternative 'readings' that are possible and perhaps choiceworthy.

We will note in detail later in the chapter that all essential interactionist analysis must involve meta analysis. The immediate importance of this while doing constant comparisons is that we must not expect to find the essence as "single layered." An illustrative example is the essence red. Were we conducting an inquiry into the essences of color, we would do well to anticipate layers of red, and thereby be able to make sense of pink, for example, when we find it in another color-site.

A value of the constant comparative method for investigating large social phenomena is that it further obligates the fieldworker continuously to visit many sites and thereby to probe more deeply

object must materialize for the other predicates ever to be able to belong to it.

Phantasy variation is a strategy both for discovery and for verification, then. We verify that we have an essence through phantasy variations by imagining the phenomenon without the essence, with the essence changed in various ways, or within various possible manifestations of the phenomenon.[5] Thus, in examining the phenomenon 'triangle' we might verify our essence statements through phantasy variations by determining whether three sides, three angles, and certain shapes and sizes of these sides and angles are necessary and immutable for triangles to exist, or whether they are merely compatible with it. We would go through phantasy variations to answer such questions as whether a triangle without these elements would become another figure, and whether a figure without these essences is impossible, since it would include incompatible ingredients (Spiegelberg, 1965: 680).

Sticking to this example, we can also answer a common criticism of the technique of phantasy variation. We do not vary possible worlds at random or needlessly. We would not, for instance, consider phantasy variations for the essences of triangles in worlds where straight lines cannot exist, or where all angles are larger than 360°. For every phantasy variation we must be able to demonstrate how the world so conceived could actually come to exist. Phantasy variations upon empty sets would be fruitless.

Essential relationships[6]

Neither essences nor phenomena are disconnected entities floating in space and time. Both are connected to other entities in essential ways. Essential interactionist investigations must determine (1) the essential relationships among the essences of the phenomenon and (2) the essential relationships between the phenomenon and other phenomena.

We sought in the previous steps to distinguish the essences of a phenomenon from those properties which appear under certain manifestations but not under others. Next we attempt the same process of elimination for relationships between essences. Typically, essences will be found in various configurations within the variety of manifestations of a phenomenon. Through the methods of constant comparisons and phantasy variations, we try to determine which of these relationships among the essences are essential. This consists in practice of rearranging the essences or connecting them in different ways and noting (1) whether the fundamental structure of the phenomenon remains unaffected by

discussion of generalization, via the example of a triangle, which is an essence in some cases, but is subordinated under another essence, spatial shape. In turn, the particular triangle may be found to contain the independent essence red, which entails further essences, and so forth (*Ideas*, Sec. 13).

Even further, in his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl recognizes that vagueness may itself be an essence of certain objects and phenomena, and must therefore be accepted and reported by the phenomenologist. This is the significant difference between the essences of phenomenologically-oriented social science, including essential interactionism, and similar conceptions such as Weber's notion of ideal-types (1970c: 245):

> The spatial figure of the tree, exactly taken as it is present in the corresponding perception, that is to say as a moment of the intentional object, is not a geometric formation; neither is it ideal nor exact in the sense of exact geometry. In the same way an intuited color is not an ideal color.

A goal of phenomenologically based inquiries is to investigate social reality as it exists for participants, which is from a variety of angles and a variety of shades of exactness, each capable of revealing essences or information about essences. That these essences sometimes are not precise in the case of social phenomena need not disturb or surprise us anymore than in phenomena from science and mathematics – such as diabetes, force, or flight – which likewise are essentially inexact.

We also recognize that our own and others' intuitions of essences may not be singular, even when they have been properly elaborated. Strasser (1974: 255) remarks that 'human perception has the character of an endless (in principle) series of acts rather than of a definitive, absolutely satisfying intuition.'

In short, as essential interactionists we approach social phenomena expecting varying degrees of vagueness and many essences, which themselves are available in varying degrees of clearness. Even were we able to locate all of the essences currently present, that would be only the beginning of our meta-analysis, in light of the suggested dialectical essence of the social: our own analysis in one sense becomes still another part of the phenomenon.

Further, the persons who wrote the literature we will use as sites need not be specifically aware of an essence we name in order for a case to be made that it is indeed an essence of the phenomenon. These essences are parallel units to the outcomes which other qualitative fieldworkers call 'problems' (Wax, 1971), 'hypotheses' (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975), and 'dimensions' (Ball, 1970). Thus, the ghetto participants at Suttles' (1968), sites may not have been

according to Popper: 'At least one person is alive on earth today.' No amount of possible evidence could conflict with this statement.

In summary, attempts at verification and falsification are attempts at gaining certainty, which is a special way of gaining confidence in one's work. Essential interactionists seek confidence in their work as well, but through *clarity of possibilities* rather than *certainty of facts*. Such clarity is achieved by processes of phantasy variation upon essences and constant comparisons amid alternative existing sites.

To say the above is not to say that products of essential interactionism are irrevocable or closed to external testing. Not only is it possible for others to apply essential interactionist methods to the same phenomenon, they may also apply these methods to the previous inquiry, or to parts of the previous inquiry. Despite the misunderstanding of some of his critics, this is not a possibility ruled out by Husserl. He recognized in *Cartesian Meditations* and in Sections 50 and 51 of *Ideas* a social unity or community world which he calls *Kulturwelt* and which grows out of his notions of intersubjectivity. Within these concepts exist the possibility for what we might call 'intersubjective verification' (see Lauer, 1958: Chapter 8 for a more complete discussion). Such an exercise, one must note immediately, is a type of 'comparing of notes,' of saying 'I did such-and-such to such-and-such ends, and you are invited to do the same and see if you end up with the same.' This is precisely what objectivistically oriented researchers do when they verify.

Further, Goodman's (1951: Chapter IV), work points out that essences[9] are revocable on specific grounds. Although any essence takes on the trappings of a decree, and is therefore incapable of being challenged by itself, when it is placed amid other essences (as in the study of phenomena) it is open to revocation according to the criteria of workability and compatibility.

Under workability, an essence is tested to see how much difficulty it will give us if we accept it as a possibility. Goodman's example (100), is of perversely considering an essence of an apple to be the color of the sky on a clear day. This will create difficulties as soon as I begin describing the essences of the sky, or work with the sky and the apple together. I would have to abandon either the unitary color of a clear sky or the unitary color of the apple, and transitivity of identity is a concept which would seem so valuable that I would instead be obligated to see my previous essence statement as unworkable. This example also illustrates revocation by compatibility. An essence of an apple (and also of a sky) is its possession of transitivity of identity, and our new essence may be rejected on the grounds that it is not compatible with this other essence.

As Goodman put it (101), if an essence (quale) 'survives because

part three

First illustration of a method

A return 'to the things themselves' requires a return to the persons who construct the things.

Introduction

This Part is an initial illustration of the essential interactionist method described in the previous chapters. The procedures noted in Chapter 4 will be applied to the phenomenon of prejudice via the social scientific literature concerning this phenomenon, by treating the literature as sites. The process begins by locating and mapping the various sites and determining which properties the participants at the sites consider essential.

Then we begin vertical and horizontal comparisons to determine whether the essences suggested by these previous researchers hold up. Some of these can be promptly discounted through illustrations of sites at which the property is not present. Those features which remain are considered possible essences, and we make extensive rounds throughout the sites to specify how and why each of these essences operates or appears not to operate. We try to determine not only whether these possible essences are to be accepted as essential, but also to describe and understand them as fully as possible.

Only one of the possible essences actually will be examined in depth in this book, however. The goal is not to present a complete theory of prejudice, but to provide an illustration (first experiment) with this particular method for essential interactionist research. It is hoped that significant theoretical insights will be obtained through this illustration (including additional possible essences). But more important to the overall goal is to uncover inadequacies of the method through its initial application. Indeed, the book is intended as a methodological study more than as a study of prejudice.

The Part concludes with a chapter discussing some initial theoretical statements about prejudice and prejudice reduction that can be made on the basis of the illustration of the method. This is followed by a final chapter assessing the method in light of its initial

5 Maps and proposed essences

In line with the methodological strategy suggested in Chapter 4, the first work was to search and take notes on listings for 'prejudice' in several university and community libraries' card catalogues, in current *Books in Print* volumes, and in *Sociological Abstracts*. On the basis of suggestions found therein, the same search was made of listings for 'discrimination.' From these searches, lists were constructed of about 125 titles of social science books dating to the 1800s and sociology and social psychology papers of the last ten years. Nearly 90 per cent of these materials were located and read, and notes were kept concerning their basic contents.

Key informants

On the basis of the initial fieldwork notes, three key informants emerged. Each of these persons has been involved for most of his adult life with numerous prejudice-literature sites and with the many people of these sites. Gordon Allport, James Jones and Howard Ehrlich each put together detailed books which offer tours and analyses of the social science literature on prejudice. Each attempts to summarize the literature to date on prejudice.

Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (1958), is referred to at many other sites as 'the classic work on prejudice.' Allport considers prejudice from several angles, including the types of persons who are considered prejudiced, objects of prejudice, theories of prejudice, formation of prejudice, personality features in prejudice, reducing prejudice, cultural elements of prejudice, stereotyping, and traits of object groups. An important point which emerged in reading Allport is the need for a variety of types of maps, rather than simply one dividing the sites according to theory. As this key informant so clearly demonstrates in his tours and

Map I

I Psychoanalytic
  A *Projection*: scapegoating I
  B Frustration-aggression displacement to scapegoating II
  C The authoritarian personality
  D Child-rearing practices

II Historical
  A Marxist
  B Industrialization
  C Situational

III Behavioristic
  A Stimulus object
  B Earned reputation

IV Functionalism
  A Functional
  B Dysfunctional

V General sociocultural determinism
  A Socioeconomic status and mobility
  B Education
  C Socialization
  D Self-and-other attitudes
  E Pluralism vs. assimilationism
  F Contact: intergroup relations determinants (and conflict theory)
  G Marginality

Two major groups seem curiously missing from the map: symbolic interactionism and phenomenological. Neither was located during my own search nor reported during those of the three key informants for either variety of theorizing. Both Allport and Jones do mention the possibility of phenomenological theories of prejudice, but neither specify any existing work in these areas. Other missing categories will probably present themselves during the course of the fieldwork. It is clear that we may need to develop some general theorizing from these missing areas and to research within these frameworks to see if the positions have anything to say about prejudice.

The second mapping is according to *ways of persuasion*:

permits us to begin hermeneutically, by searching for essences within the taken-for-granted beliefs of the participants. Care must be taken, however, not to be blinded by these definitions. An attempt is made to combine the traditional fieldwork dictum that 'features should emerge from the fieldwork, not be brought by the fieldworkers' with our goal to uncover and elaborate essences. To that end the definitions are aproached critically and with the expectation that brief constant comparisons and variations will eliminate some. Although the definitions contain for the most part only those features which the participants at the sites consider essential, the participants are not speaking of essentialism in our terms. A result is that an essential interactionist analysis is not obliged to reply to each such statement on its own grounds, but rather to sift from these definitions the possible essences.

Lengthy rounds were conducted through key sites, and prior to that, brief visits occurred at a majority of the approximately 600 sites. As might be expected, the same elements of prejudice were repeated in the definitions at several sites. From the fieldnotes of definitions at the key (about 100) sites, the following comparably short list includes all of the elements offered by these definitions:

> An interpersonal hostility which is directed againt individuals based on their membership in a minority group (Jack Levin, 1975).
>
> A pattern of hostility in interpersonal relations which is directed against an entire group, or against its individual members; it fulfills a specific irrational function for its bearer (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950).
>
> Prejudice is defined as hostility or aggression toward individuals on the basis of their group membership (Buss, 1961).
>
> Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group. The net effect . . . is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own misconduct (Allport, 1954).
>
> Race prejudice is a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources may both be justified (Cox, 1948).
>
> We are now in a position to understand the anti-Semite. He is a man who is afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself, of his own consciousness, of his liberty, of his instincts, of his

entirely possible that essences would emerge from other items on the maps.

The components of these definitions may be mapped as follows, according to the *overall crucial features as defined by the participants*:

Map 3

I Activity toward target(s)
- Behaviors toward
  1 Hostility
  2 Aggression
- Attitudes toward
  Direction:
  1 Negative
  2 Positive
  Type:
  3 Social
  4 Sick ('social neuroticism')
  5 Emotional
    (a) Fear of self
    (b) Antipathy
  6 Not easily changeable
  7 Stereotyped
  8 Without (or before) information
    (a) Objective evidence
    (b) Actual experience

II Types of targets
- 1 Individual
- 2 Individuals on basis of group membership
- 3 Minority groups(s)
- 4 Belief holders
- 5 Objects

III Functions
- 1 Advantage for possessor
- 2 To meet normative demands
- 3 Reduced efficiency by reducing collective achievement

Our goal in working with these definitions is both to simplify and to elaborate the notions of prejudice contained therein. We first simplify by seeking from the third map those items to consider as posible essences, and this is accomplished by eliminating items that exist within prejudice only in certain of its manifestations. To constitute a potential essence of prejudice an item must potentially exist in any manifestation of the phenomenon: it must have a chance of meeting the necessity requirement. It must not be immediately

attitude dimensions which prejudice may take vary according to the conditions under which prejudice manifests itself. These are described as positive or negative, sick or simply emotional. Although prejudiced persons do tend to stereotype, we cannot list this as immutable. Ehrlich demonstrates in his tours through the literature sites that for some persons prejudice consists not of holding stereotypes, but instead consists of conative responses (behavior intentions) or affective responses. We also must not include the condition of 'not easily changeable,' since various persons in various situations will hold their prejudiced attitudes with greater or lesser vivacity and therefore be more or less easily changeable.

3 The item concerning possession of information cannot be retained in its present forms. Prejudicing toward something (or accomplishing anything toward something) is impossible without some information. One must be able in some way to identify what the target is. Such information can come only through objective evidence; if we take the meaning of 'objective' as in Websters', 'of or having to do with a known or perceived object as distinguished from something existing only in the mind of the subject.' And information about the outside world mut be via 'actual experience.' Furthermore, informant Barry Collins (1970), summarizes numerous contact situations in which prejudice did not diminish after the prejudicing persons had contacts with the targets of their prejudices.

These objections notwithstanding, one can intuit that this category relates to prejudice, in the original sense of the concept 'to prejudge.' This we will need to explore.

4 An item which remains is that prejudice is social; prejudice is directed toward an other or others. This possible essence of 'toward others' is not a simple one. Although prejudiced persons typically direct their prejudice toward other persons and groups, many examples at the sites indicate that minority group members sometimes direct prejudices at themselves. Among these are reports of dark-skinned black troops in the United States Army taking out their aggressions against light-skinned blacks and vice versa, with the two groups referring to each other as 'spooks,' 'shiftless' and 'ignorant' (Allport, 1954: 149). Various reports suggest that a person who is prejudiced against himself is prejudiced on the basis of his membership in a group he considers an out group. Whether or not this is the case we must check through constant comparisons and variations when we investigate the possible essence we term 'toward others.' This essence will obviously have to be described more specifically, to include cases where one's self becomes the target of the prejudice (unless this is done by making the self into an other).

analogies, but still retain the possible essence within this section of map 3.

A third difficulty is the item 'to meet normative demands.' This proposes that the ways in which social instruments can be used are determined through normative structures. From a hermeneutic viewpoint, we must search out ways in which persons take the moral order as true, or are obligated to accept as fact what others accept as fact, including the potential inhering in instruments. On the other hand, our essentialism specifies that we look concurrently at the essences of social instruments in general and how these affect the normative order's power over the instruments.

7 Finally and similarly, we must look at 'reduces efficiency by reducing collective achievement' in light of the foregoing. Ordinarily, instruments can both increase and decrease efficiency, depending upon how they are used. One can certainly find prejudice used to increase efficiency. The Sherif (1961) site is an apparent example. The two groups developed at Sherif's summer camp used prejudice against one another to increase their efficiency at competing with one another. Each group thereby increased the efficiency of its collective achievement. Only if we consider the two groups as one can we consider what happened at the summer camp as reducing efficiency by reducing collective achievement.

Delimiting the experiment

The previous chapters have specified a few concurrent goals crucial to the sort of phenomenological sociology of which essential interactionism is a part. First, we seek a critical examination of taken-for-granted features of the lifeworld (i.e. a hermeneutic inquiry). Second, we seek essences of social phenomena. And third, we seek understandings of these essences in their richness, rather than thin descriptions which permit simplified appreciations, fewer pages of description, and precise statements. It follows that our first experiment – which constitutes the remainder of this book – should concern itself (1) with as thick a description and analysis as resources permit of only one or two essences; (2) that the initial essence be one which is uncritically assumed at many of the sites to be true; and (3) that we investigate not only to determine whether something is an essence, also its potential to reveal other essences.

Of the possible essences which emerged from fieldwork with the above definitions the one which seems best to meet these criteria is the instrument essence. Most of the sites are functionalist or Freudian in orientation, and both groups take for granted that prejudice is an instrument. The other possible essences which have

possible essences, as follows: (1) pre-judging, (2) toward others, and (3) instrumental.

The initial experiment with the method to be carried out in the following chapters was delimited to investigation via one possible essence: the suggested instrumental essence. Major goals for the experiment are (1) to provide a thick description and analysis of only a few essences, (2) to begin with a possible essence uncritically assumed at many of the sites, and (3) to permit elaboration of this essence to result in specification of other possible essences.



Before discussing material from the functionalists, this is perhaps a good time to state explicitly what was already suggested in previous discussions concerning the possibility of using work by theorists without accepting their theory. The tendency in sociology has been to throw out the baby with the bath water: when serious deficiencies are indicated in a theory, large groups of sociologists abandon that theory and all of its contributions to understanding social life. In reading social theory and research and in talking with social theorists and researchers one is struck by the vivacity with which they believe what they are positing. In many cases this zealousness is the inevitable result of the competition between paradigms for legitimation within a field (*à la* Kuhn, 1970). In other cases it bespeaks the need for persons to legitimate a political ideology, a social class, an ethnicity, a reference group, or a combination thereof. Whatever the case, part of the zealousness can probably be attributed to the attempt by its possessor to advance herself in the profession.

But I would suggest that most social theorists and researchers forcefully believe their 'discoveries' for another reason as well: these apparent truths struck the investigators forcefully. They stood out among a variety of possibilities and amid great confusion. Regardless how much of this process we care to explain via social, psychological, and physiological mechanisms, one point must remain. Persons who allow themselves initial confusion, experimentation and critical inquiry believe their major theoretical positions because these positions make understandable for them previously disparate and murky aspects of social works. The 'ah-hah!' experience so frequently noted by Gestaltists cannot be adequately reduced. Those moments at which the various parts come together to form something distinctly different are moments at which a theorist or researcher solidifies his position.

Theoretical positions tend to have integrity, then, even amid equally serious criticisms. Consequently when I turn to the functionalists for some understanding of the instrumental nature of prejudice and thereby open myself to the accusation that functionalism has been rejected as inadequate social theory, I can offer only one reply. I agree that 'the trouble with functionalism is that it is committed to the present society, with all its dilemmas, contradictions, tension, and indeed, with all its immorality' (Gouldner, 1970: 281), that it is functionalism's blindness to rationalize what is and to neglect what society can become, and how it should be changed (Lee, 1975) and that the organic analogy is inappropriate. Indeed, I recently presented a critique of functionalism (Glassner and Freedman, 1979). But in the face of these arguments I refuse to neglect the valuable insights functionalists offer and prefer instead

Berkowitz (1962) looked at a variety of frustration-aggression sites and concluded that 'every frustration increases the instigation of aggression.' That such instigation is present can be demonstrated via numerous sites. Most often cited at other sites is Hovland and Sears (1940), who computed the correlation (−0.60) between the annual per-acre value of cotton in the South and the number of lynchings per year for the period 1882 and 1930. Similarly, the depression of the 1930s saw the birth of 114 organizations concerned with increasing anti-Semitism (Rose, 1958). During this same period a substantial number of nativist organizations worked to exclude potential immigrants and to deport recent arrivals, blaming these people for America's economic difficulties (LaGumina, 1973).

Other indications derive from Bettleheim and Janowitz's (1950), study of relative deprivation among new army veterans in Chicago. They report aggressive attitudes most highly concentrated in the downwardly mobile group, while the pattern was significantly reversed for those who had advanced in social status since the period of their previous employment. Those who had experienced no change were somewhat in the middle.

Mobility-frustration is not limited to the downwardly mobile, however, as seen at the Greenblum and Pearlin (1953), site. Both downwardly mobile and upwardly mobile persons of those studied were more willing to accept anti-Semitic statements than those in stationary positions. That frustration seems significantly involved in these studies was illustrated by Silberstein and Seeman (1959), who conducted similar research, but distinguished persons according to degree of motivation for changing their social position. Those who were mobility-oriented and downwardly mobile or stationary were more often accepting of anti-Semitism than those who were not mobility-oriented or were upwardly mobile.

A number of laboratory studies also indicate that aggression via prejudice frequently follows frustration. These studies put people in frustrating situations, ranging from incarceration to testing, then ask their feelings about minority groups (e.g. Miller and Bugelski, 1948; Cowen *et al.*, 1959; and Holmes, 1972). But other sites point out that this aggression may be long-standing and itching for release upon a variety of targets, including those against whom the person is not prejudiced and regardless of whether frustration elicits this aggression. One part of a study by Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford (1945), points this out clearly. The prejudiced persons were shown pictures of persons representing a variety of types. Some were intended as parents of the same ethnicity and social class as the prejudiced person, others were persons of two races interacting, others were public servants, etc. Even in the cases of photographs of

interactions with a large group of persons; that these persons were ethnocentric, economically and politically conservative, and 'implicitly antidemocratic' (fascistic). This was exemplified for the researchers by remarks heard during their early studies grouping ethnic, economic and political hates within a single phrase, such as 'nigger-loving bureaucrats' or 'Jewish international bankers,' or 'the Jew is the dictator of democracy' (Allport, 1958: 67). The researchers set out to demonstrate the existence of this personality type, to describe it more precisely, and to indicate its persistence among varied groups and throughout the life cycle. The researchers set up their research with the goal of finding intercorrelations between the dimensions of this alleged personality.

Self-reports, clinical interviews and projective techniques were employed. The main written tests were the anti-Semitism (A-S) scale, the Ethnocentrism (E) scale, the Political and Economic Conservatism scale (PEC) and the Implicit Anti-democratic Trends (F) scale. Adorno *et al.* administered the scales to 2000 persons: college students, union members, and members of civic and service groups. As expected, the replies indicated high correlations between anti-Semitism, general ethnocentrism, ideological conservatism, and authoritarianism. The researchers conclude that the prejudiced person uses clear-cut attitudes to maintain a rigid defense against his or her own unacceptable impulses and moral uncertainties. This conclusion is in accord with the other neo-Freudian sites. The researchers make several leaps in order to come to this conclusion, and we must tear apart their decision making process, both vertically, through a look at how it occurred within the study, and through horizontal comparisons with other studies.

Of the high correlations, one must look closely at the scale items. The F, E, and PEC scales included some items of similar content. The items 'The artist and professor are of just as much value to society as the businessman and manufacturer' and 'The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and professor' are from the PEC scale and the F scale, but are identical except in direction of scoring. A person who agrees with one should agree with the other and will spuriously increase the degree of correlation among the scales.

The scales contain items considered high, or low prejudice by the researchers rather than by the 'subjects' or other groups within the society. Simpson and Yinger (1972: 80) note:

> If a person high on a scale of prejudice (ethnocentricism) admires generals and political figures and one low in prejudice admires scientists and writers, this is not necessarily evidence of a different outlook on life. If a prejudice scale is negatively

researchers took twenty-nine items from the ethnocentrism scales and rewrote them to refer to 'people' or 'most people', instead of Jews, blacks, or other specific groups. 'Jews seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant, and sensual way of living' becomes 'People seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant, and sensual way of living.' The revised scale was administered to 221 mid-western college students, along with a 20-item E scale. The correlation between the two was 0.53. The students in general would attribute these characteristics to most people, not only to the target groups.

At a still more basic level, we must question how the researchers can tell anything related to general personality or prejudice structure with items such as: 'Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.' This depends upon whether one has experienced astrology, whether it seemed to 'work,' and similar questions for one's reference group members, as well as one's degree of superstition, which was what Adorno *et al.* attempted to measure with the question.

The other part of the conclusion noted above – that prejudice is used as a defense against one's own unacceptable impulses and moral uncertainties – depends in large part upon 70 in-depth interviews. Adorno *et al.* coded these responses to reveal five categories of personality traits: repression versus awareness, externalization versus internalization, conventionalism versus genuineness, power versus love orientation, and rigidity versus flexibility. The highly-prejudiced persons cluster on the left side of each pair, tolerant persons on the right. A look at the responses between the groups does reveal striking differences in orientations toward social worlds, although their differences would be characterized in different terms by different groups (e.g., the prejudiced's peers might speak of 'repression' as 'appropriate thoughts').

But to make the leap that prejudice results from unacceptable impulses and moral uncertainties may be unwarranted. 'Aware' or 'flexible' persons also have unacceptable impulses and moral uncertainties, just of different varieties. Projective tests (and simple phantasy variations) indicate that such 'love-oriented' persons in many cases repress their feelings of violence. Any committed person has unacceptable impulses (and therefore moral uncertainties on some level). Yet we do not find all persons employing prejudices to deal with these conditions.

These vertical and horizontal comparisons indicate that we cannot conclude that a predictable set of beliefs or a single personality type is an essence of prejudice, nor *vice versa*, that prejudice is an essence of a personality type. The *Authoritarian Personality* sites do suggest, however, that prejudicing is one of

and work-histories, interviews, etc. Although all prospective employers must simplify their applicants on the basis of a relatively small number of information bits, this can be accomplished in a variety of ways. A prejudiced strategy is via limiting cognitive responses to stereotypes of 'this sort of person.'

This discussion forces us to confront another proposed essence from the definitions at the sites (noted in the previous chapter). In these definitions appear a conflict between whether the targets of prejudice are individuals, groups, or individuals on the basis of group membership. The Katz site and others suggest that the third target type may be essential. Stereotyping asserts that individuals must be like an alleged characteristic of their group.

The assertion which stereotyping makes is, 'All *A* are *B*.' As is readily apparent, this assertion is of the form of an induction. If we consider an induction adequately defended, then we can be reasonably certain that, 'This particular *A* is *B*.'

Here we have a case in which a way of prejudicing looks like a way of logical and scientific thinking. We will see throughout our inquiry that indeed the line between prejudicing and 'normal' social-mental phenomena is either very thin or non-existent. In their review of some of the sites we have considered, Hogan and Emler (1978) conclude that individuals who stereotype are not appropriately characterized as persons who make faulty inferences. The inferences are often correct. How do scientists distinguish these phenomena?

The frequently offered distinction between 'adequate' and 'inadequate' inductions offered by Hempelian scientists and philosophers of science is that, 'An inductive inference from an observed association of attributes ($A_n - B_n$) can justify inference to another case ($A_{n-1} - B_{n-1}$) or inference to the corresponding generalization (All A are B) only if the association is somehow known to be lawlike, not merely accidental' (Black, 1967). But upon what do laws rest? As Pierce, Hume and Hanson have noted in various ways, the laws cannot rest upon immediate experience or *a priori* knowledge, since people disagree about these. In social sciences (and perhaps inevitably in other sciences) the laws tend to be accepted or rejected according to their competitive advantage at predicting better than competing theories. New laws and models are argued in terms of their capacity for more or better predictions than their competitors.

Goodman (1955: 91), remarks on the absurdity of the view that 'truth and significance of a hypothesis lie in the accuracy of its predictions.' He offers what he calls the 'new riddle of induction' to illustrate this point. Suppose all emeralds examined before a certain time *t* have been green; use the label 'grue' for the property of being

disappear once falsification is demonstrated. This is well illustrated by the Karlins *et al.* (1969), site. These researchers compared the stereotypes accepted by Princeton students during Gilbert's (1951), site and Katz and Braly's (1933), site. At all three times the students accepted stereotypes, but over the years some disappeared and were replaced by others. In our present terms, some were falsified by reference group experiences, media and social science debunking, etc. Hence, blacks in 1933 were considered lazy by 75 per cent of the students, but by only 26 per cent in 1967. Yet in 1933 only 26 per cent of the students considered blacks to be musical, while in 1967 47 per cent stereotyped blacks as musical. A similar shift is noted by Bayton *et al.* (1956). When they asked white students their stereotypes about blacks, but specified that the blacks were upper-class, none of the usual stereotypes for blacks were offered, perhaps because superstitious, lazy, ignorant, etc. are considered impossible characteristics for upper-class persons to possess. But the same students did assign other sets of stereotypes to the 'new' blacks, and assigned many of the usual stereotypes against blacks to lower-class persons when asked about this group. Apparently we can falsify inductions repeatedly with the result that new inductions will be used to replace them.

In light of these problems some thinkers have suggested that inductions are necessarily inadequate or unjust. It appears, in fact, to be difficult to distinguish stereotype-inductions from other inductions. The numerous attempts by philosophers to adequately defend their inductive leaps (e.g. via *a priori* defenses, searches for supreme inductive principles, etc.) have all been shown incapable of answering (1) the Humean critique that the leaps are finally based on tradition and (2) Goodman's demonstrations of the possible difficulties which can result. The most generally accepted response at present among both philosophers and social scientists is a recourse to probability (Black, 1967).

Contemporary social science inductions are expected to be reworded into probability language: '*B* has probability relative to *A*,' or 'All *A* have probability of being *B*.' The probability conclusion still extends beyond the premises by disguised reference to sets of events not covered by the given premises (usually future events). We can avoid these difficulties by turning the inductive statements into deductive statements, and many scientists and philosophers of science are demanding this, notably through variations on Carnap's call for limiting oneself to 'state descriptions,' within which one can describe rather fully in simplified languages the items in one's propositions and the ways one is weighting these propositions. But we thereby lose the possibility of inductions in the process, because the very idea of this sort of induction is that on the

prejudiced nondiscriminators and non-prejudiced discriminators (e.g. Pilcher, 1972).

These suggest an essence underlying our note in the previous chapter that discrimination is distinct from prejudice. We can now see that the prejudicing person may be one who assigns simplified behavioral intentions to himself with regard to target groups, even if he does not carry out these intentions under certain circumstances.

This point became especially clear to me in light of a report by an executive of a large American corporation. The executive's job was to implement 'affirmative action' guidelines from the federal government for the hiring of minority workers. He reported his surprise at visiting corporate officers in Alabama and in New Jersey. The personnel executives at the Alabama office apparently complained bitterly about 'having to hire coloreds,' while the personnel executives at the New Jersey office apparently complained that they 'sure would like to hire some blacks.' Yet the Alabama office had quickly reached its federally-determined percentage quota for black employees, while the New Jersey office had hired only a small percentage of the number of blacks required by law. The New Jersey office explained that they could not find qualified black job applicants.

One would have to research both offices to determine how these contrasting outcomes resulted, but clearly the conative reactions of these employees were inversely related to their hiring behavior.

The conative dimension of the tool of prejudice is usually described in terms of social distance, a scale for which was devised first in 1925 by Emory Bogardus. The scale offers persons a list of statements indicating varying degrees of desired social intimacy, together with a list of names of social groups. In the first Bogardus scale, persons were asked (1925):

> According to my first feeling reaction, I would willingly admit members of each race (as a class and not the best I have known, nor the worst members) to the classifications which I have marked.

Bogardus asked a panel of judges in 1932 to rate 60 statements about degrees of distance. From their rating, these seven statements were selected as roughly equidistant along a scale of increasing social distance:

1 Would marry
2 Would have as a regular friend
3 Would work beside in an office
4 Would have several families in my neighborhood
5 Would have merely as speaking acquaintances

twelve groups changed their distance rank as a result of this modification, and two groups shifted one scale point on the six-point scale of distance.

Rokeach, Smith and Evans (1960) gave white college students descriptions of a pair of target persons. The students judged how likely they were to become friendly with each of the persons. The target pairs were presented as follows:

1 Race varied-belief constant (e.g. a white person who believes in God vs a black who believes in God).
2 Belief varied-race constant (e.g. a white person who believes in God vs a white person who is an atheist).
3 Race and belief varied (e.g. a white person who believes in God vs a black who is an atheist).

The students were asked to indicate their own feelings about each of the eight belief statements, so that they could compare their own beliefs with those given for the targets. The students indicated preferences for whites to blacks when beliefs were held constant, and for people with whom they agreed to people with whom they disagreed when race was held constant. Of the third pairing, the students tended to choose persons with their own beliefs, rather than those of their same race. This site suggests that social distance tests cannot in their usual form discriminate which types of target (e.g. belief or race) the prejudiced persons wish to avoid. It also suggests that the conative aspect of prejudice appears to be directed more on the basis of targets' beliefs than on targets' races. As Triandis (1960), and others note, however, one cannot predict (and certainly not make essence statements about) the relative importance of beliefs and race among prejudiced persons in general on the basis of the Rokeach site. Belief-congruence may be more consequential only for the conative response of "friendship." For other distances – neighbor, co-worker, fellow citizen – race may be more important than belief. Or the relative importance of these items may be situationally determined.

This discussion points out several difficulties for researchers who investigate prejudice by using social distance scales to determine who is prejudiced and how strongly. But our own concern is with utilizing these specifications of the conative aspect of prejudice to describe essences of prejudice. An essence which appears to emerge from the foregoing is simplification. We saw in the discussion of why people stereotype that they do so in large part to simplify their definitions of targets. We can see from the present section that people use prejudice in other cases as a conative instrument for purposes of simplifying their behavior intentions towards targets. The targets they choose may be belief-holders,

responses (affective and cognitive) to race (Dombrowski, 1950). On the other side, Cleaver (1968), was capable of similar affective simplification in justifying a program of mass raping of white women on the grounds that the correct response of a black militant to white women is hate and punishment.

From the foregoing we can suggest, along with Ehrlich (1973), that the potential ways that prejudice can be used as an instrument are at least three: stereotyping (the cognitive dimension), social distancing (the conative dimension), and affect. These three possibilities are apparently used for purposes of simplifying social worlds relative to target groups.

A social psychological instrument: how?

The sites exemplify a common aspect of social science literature sites: the questions being asked at the sites are almost always of the variety, 'Why are people prejudiced?' One reason is that most of the literature was produced by persons who think in causal terms, and 'why' questions are varieties of causal questions eliciting 'because' replies.

The instrumental nature of prejudice suggests that another type of question may be more appropriate, namely, 'How do people use prejudice?,' or a possible variation, 'How do people prejudice?' This can be seen if we compare to material instruments. We may well ask questions such as, 'Why does she use a hammer to accomplish job X?' In response, we expect causal answers: 'because that is the tool people use for job X most of the time,' 'because she is constrained by social or physical circumstances to use a hammer for job X,' 'because she perceives a hammer as uniquely suited for accomplishing job X owing to its properties A, B, and C.' As essential interactionists we seek the third sort of answer, except where elements of the first two answers prove to be essential to the phenomenon of hammers or hammer-use. And this chapter thus far has dealt with answering this sort of question.

We may also ask 'How do people use hammers,' or 'How can people use hammers?', or 'How does one hammer?' The first two questions seek descriptions, the last seeks prescription. I would argue with Fritz Perls (1969), that in general *how* questions lead to more informative and more essential answers than do *why* questions. The latter lead to explanatoriness, probably due to their implied causality. I have suggested that such questions can be answered with interactionistic replies rather than causal replies, but at that point they are very close to having been re-thought as *how* questions.

We can see within the literature on prejudice as a tool some

own eyes is offered by the Katz (1972 and 1975), sites, which show persons attributing to deviants a set of inherent and unchangeable characteristics which do not demand visible proof. Just as witches have been considered 'possessed' and the mentally ill are said to 'have a problem,' so it is possible for a variety of types of targets to be considered possessors of something invisible which makes them necessarily members of a group. Persons at the Secord site apparently considered blackness and whiteness to be items which people possess, regardless of whether others can see these items with their eyes. The voluminous evidence reviewed by Montagu (1974), also supports the suggestion, through case studies of groups at various historical periods attributing race to persons on the basis of evidence which these same persons would have considered inadequate for supporting other attributions. He further notes that prior to the sixteenth century, the concept of race did not exist. Montagu offers case after case in which the attribution of race cannot be justified empirically, but is accepted.

These sites and others suggest an explanation of stereotyping much in accord with that of labeling theory (Lemert, 1951 and Becker, 1963). This bespeaks of the relative nature of social worlds, including the present feature of stereotyping.

But amid this relativity, there seems to be some object determinism. Films of a subnormal ten-year-old girl and boy were shown to 42 college students by Guskin (1962). Half of the students were told that both children were retarded, the other half were told only that they were school-children. The filmed boy displayed obvious physical symptoms; the girl had none. After viewing the films, the students rated the children on scaled items such as confident-timid, strange-normal, capable-helpless, unintelligent-bright, and clumsy-skillful. Whether labeled subnormal or not, the girl's ratings on these adjective lists remained about the same. Hence, the site suggests that the labeling of subnormality had an effect only when the target's characteristics were in some sense perceived as relevant and validating.

My visits to the prejudice sites overall reveal that part of *how* people simplify target groups is by picking up some objective feature about the group and using it to replace several features. In his survey of popular anti-Semitic writings, Selzer (1972), illustrates this point. In small-town America at various historical points, it was not far from accurate to say that Jews owned the major businesses, that they were shrewd businessmen, or that they were mercenary. Yinger (1964), summarizes the dialectic at work here:

> However one may explain the origin of tendencies of minority-group members, to the contemporary generation – few of whom

How people social distance

We noted above that the conative way of prejudicing can be used to simplify groups 'as needed,' be they ethnic groups or belief holders. This can be expanded as an introduction to how people prejudice conatively by including a few additional sites.

Shim and Dole (1967), questioned Hawaiian college students and their parents concerning preferred personal distances from persons who are missing one or two legs, and from blacks. The physical disability turned out to be a stronger determinant of personal distance than did race, but in further questioning, the attribution of incompetence or lack of empathy brought greater rejection than did either disability or race.

Especially interesting is the innovative site by E. L. Hartley (1946), in which college students were asked their attitudes, using a Bogardus Social Distance Scale, concerning thirty-five nations and races. Three of the ethnicities listed were fictitious – the 'Danereans,' 'Pireneans,' and the 'Wallonians.' The result was that the students who desired high social distance from the actual ethnic groups also preferred high distance from the nonexistent groups. The correlation between social distance scores for the real and nonexistent groups was around +0.80. When one looks at the answers written in longhand, given in addition to the forced choice responses, an interesting insight emerges. One student wrote of the nonexistent peoples, 'I don't know anything about them: therefore I would exclude them from my country.' Another student, low on social distance against real groups, wrote, 'I don't know anything about them; therefore I have no prejudices against them.'

We can see, then, that one answer to how people social distance is that they simplify their behavioral intentions either toward or away from groups who appear to be threatening. How do persons determine which groups are threatening? Three answers emerge from the sites.

First, persons are socialized by their own groups concerning who to exclude. Spoerl (1951: 76), administered the Bogardus Social Distance Scale to 900 freshmen students in an eastern college. Among her findings:

> Jewish students stood highest in their rejection of Canadians, English, Finnish, French, German, Irish, Norwegian, Scottish, and Swedish (a rejection of the 'majority' or 'favored' groups in our country). Catholic students stood highest in rejection of Chinese, Hindus, Japanese, Negroes, and Filipinos (a rejection of the colored groups – possibly associated with the idea of 'heathen'). Protestant students stood highest in rejecting

reported the possibility of twelve categories of affect:

1 aggression: defiant, rebellious, angry, furious, ready to fight.
2 fatigue: drowsy, dull, sleepy, tired, sluggish.
3 concentration: careful, contemplative, attentive, serious, efficient
4 surgency: carefree, playful, witty, lively, talkative
5 social: affectionate, forgiving, kindly, warm-hearted, sociable
6 anxiety: clutched up, fearful, jittery, tense, nervous
7 skepticism: skeptical, suspicious, dubious
8 egotism: egotistic, self-centered, boastful, aloof
9 sadness: sad, blue, lonely, down-hearted, sorry
10 vigor, general activation: active, energetic, vigorous, bold, strong
11 elation: overjoyed, elated, pleased
12 nonchalance: bored, leisurely (Nowlis, 1965)

Other sites offer different lists. For example, Davitz (1969), offers such categories as:

activation: admiration, amusement, awe, cheerfulness, delight
moving toward: affection, love
hypoactivation: boredom, depression, anger, fear, panic
inadequacy: anxiety

We can expect affective responses to groups to change over time, since they are developed within intra- and inter-group interactions, and these interactions change in type, magnitude, meaning, etc. Persons at the sites restrict their 'subjects' responses through forced-response and numerical-response demands, of course, and through the simplifying nature of questionnaires as a medium. Probably prejudicing persons could name other affective interactions with their targets as well. But it does appear that some prejudicing persons can identify their repertoire of affects to simplify interactions with targets.

That these sorts of affective reactions can effectively simplify on a large scale – and that they are distinguished from the other ways of prejudicing – are pointed out by two sites: Myrdal (1944), and the novel *Invisible Man*. Both portray the attitudes of Northern whites as involving a convenient ignorance of blacks. Blacks were hardly noticed, and if noticed are avoided. Myrdal notes that this type of reaction to blacks permits them to be further simplified, into the equally invisible (to middle and upper classes) lower classes.

A similar strategy for affective simplification can be seen in Kitsuse's (1964), site concerning reactions to homosexuals. The

and stereotype correlated at 0.42 and affect and behavior intention at 0.64. Campbell and McCandless (1951), reported correlations (r) between affect and personal distance as 0.87 and affect and stereotype as 0.77. Ostrom (1969), found the average intercorrelation of each component with the other two was 0.59. In this study Ostrom was looking at attitudes about church, rather than those about the usual targets of such studies.

Here we have a case of important constant conjunctions within an essence. These conjunctions reveal that the three techniques for simplifying tend to be found intermingling. But we must look at the sites critically. In all cases the prejudiced persons were forced to respond to the words given to them, rather than to devise their own prejudicing. What these sites reveal is that many prejudiced people tend to be capable and willing to use all three techniques for simplifying; not that prejudiced persons necessarily use all three. Indeed, Kramer's (1950), site is similar to several which make this point clear. Whites were shown papers containing 'distance zones' from an area where blacks were moving. Zone 1 was the closest to this area of expanding black residency. Zone 5 was the most remote, being three miles away. There was a general tendency among whites living in these regions to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. Kramer checked further, however, to seek relationships between these desires and the stereotyping the residents were doing. In Zone 1, where the white residents had the closest contact with the blacks, only five per cent offered stereotypes as reasons for exclusion; as against 25 per cent of the residents in Zone 5. In contrast, the intensity of hostile feelings or behavior intentions in Zone 1 was higher than in Zone 5. In Zone 1, 64 per cent of the residents made spontaneous expressions of hostility, whereas only four per cent in Zone 5 offered hostile reactions. Apparently hostility and stereotypes were not conjoined for most of these persons.

These studies suggest an important (though apparently non-essential) interaction which helps to determine which technique(s) individuals will employ. The prejudicing person interacts with the target of his prejudice and on the basis of this interaction selects techniques for simplifying. In other words, the target is influential in determining the choice of simplification techniques. The Ewens and Ostrom studies note, for instance, that the affective technique was stronger for the subjects in prejudicing towards blacks, but the behavior intention technique was stronger for prejudicing toward the church. This helps to make some sense of the reports at many of the sites for the empirical basis for stereotypes. Jews are regularly stereotyped as aggressive capitalists (Selzer, 1972), Americans as spoiled brats (Lederer, 1958), drunks as skid row bums (Pittman,

mathematicians Kronecker, Minkowski and Jacobi. Asks Merton (1949: 434):

> And who is thus busily engaged in singing the praises of the Jews? Who has so assiduously compiled the list of many hundreds of distinguished Jews who contributed so notably to science, literature and the arts – a list from which these few cases were excerpted? A philo-Semite, eager to demonstrate that his people have contributed their due share to world culture? No, by now we should know better than that. The complete list will be found in the thirty-sixth edition of the anti-Semitic handbook by the racist Fritsch. In accord with the alchemical formula for transmuting in-group virtues into out-group vices, he presents this as a roll call of sinister spirits who have usurped the accomplishments properly owing the Aryan in-group.

The material at the Merton site suggests an additional note about the structure of the simplification-essence. The simplifying apparently need not be of a consistent nature, and 'empirical cues' are made to fit the need of accomplishing the prejudicing.

Where can prejudicing persons turn to determine how to prejudice in those cases in which interactions with the target are not definitive? Tumin's (1958) site, as reanalyzed by Blalock (1967: 131), offers an answer. Tumin administered a questionnaire to 28[?] Greensboro, North Carolina white male adults. He found virtually no difference between high socio-economic status persons and low status persons with respect to their stereotypes of blacks. This remained true even when differential educational, income, and occupational groups were considered. Tumin inferred that underlying prejudice levels were basically unrelated to class differences. But Blalock notes that significant differences occurred with respect to questions such as what the prejudiced expected of their own and blacks' behavior in hypothetical situations, of what they would do about blacks, and their feelings about blacks. In our terms, class differences in this community did exist. Apparently various classes were using different techniques for prejudicing, or at least using the techniques in varied strengths.

Even within an individual technique for prejudicing it appears that groups utilize their ability to manipulate the instrument to satisfy the needs of the group members. Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964), argue that stereotypes of Jews help prejudiced persons deal with superego concerns, while stereotypes toward blacks concern the id. Adjectives typically applied to Jews by anti-Semites include: ambitious, striving, crafty, clannish, shrewd, hyper-intelligent, sly, and dishonest. Compare these with adjectives typically applied to blacks by white racists: unambitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky,

works by philosophers of science to determine whether distinctions exist between prejudicing inductions and scientific or logical inductions. The brief survey suggested the difficulty for any induction to support its reliance upon tradition in choosing predicates or its future predictions. Several comparisons were made between social scientists' methods for inductive reasoning and prejudicing persons' methods, to demonstrate both the close relationship and the distinctions between prejudicing and 'normal' behavior.

Social distancing was investigated next, beginning with vertical comparisons to reveal the birth of this concept with LaPiere's (1934), site and the Bogardus scales. Sites were offered which revealed that behavior intentions do not necessarily predict actual behavior, and it is suggested that social distancing appears to be a way of prejudicing which is distinct from stereotyping.

The possibility of simplification as an essence of prejudice then began to emerge as we recognized that both stereotyping and social distancing were ways in which prejudice was brought to be an instrument for simplification of targets. To this list was added a final way of prejudicing, namely, simplified affect. A variety of uses for simplified affect were noted through horizontal comparisons of sites dealing with several historical periods.

The three methods for prejudicing (stereotyping, social distancing and simplified affect) were next investigated by replacing 'why' questions with 'how' questions. How persons stereotype is related to features of language, and the acceptability of attributing inherent features to persons. The object-dependent nature of stereotyping was elaborated through comparisons of similar sites at different historical periods, which showed the partial dependence of stereotyping persons upon characteristics of their targets. A final source of stereotypes was shown to be media depictions of groups.

Persons were seen to social distance on the basis of threat, which appears to be determined by the prejudicing person's reference groups, the mass media, and physical distance from the targets. Persons apparently affectively simplify by narrowing their possible reactions to targets to a relatively small list which is applied by habit when the target persons are confronted.

The tendency for more than one method of prejudicing to be employed by prejudicing persons was uncovered at some sites. But an essential insight emerged from noting that (1) no cases were found in which persons did not accomplish prejudice by at least one of the three methods (stereotyping, social distancing or simplified affect), and (2) some persons prejudiced through use of only one of these methods. Hence, a suggested essence is the presence of at least one of these three methods.

attractions and upon common interests and abilities. Activities were arranged by adults, but the boys decided upon team mates, seats at meals, and buddies for free time play. During these three days, friendship clusters emerged and leadership structures were apparent within the boys' groups.

Sherif's presentation of material from these three days is minimal, but there is indication of the effective natural ordering the boys began during this period. The following is from a summary by an adult participant observer of a two-hour hike (1953: 245):

> The hikers did not proceed according to plan up the river toward New Boston. Along the highway, the boys saw a dirt trail veering off to the left, and with the assent of the lead counselor, they took it. The trail ended abruptly and the hikers decided to climb the mountain. About half way up it was decided to have a race to the top. The three boys who won the race were Hall, Miller, and Crane. Hall told (staff member) that they all walked to the top abreast by mutual agreement, so that no one of them would arrive before the other two.
>
> After this incident the three boys called themselves 'The Three Musketeers.' The next morning they went out to catch salamanders while the other boys were playing softball. Upon their return, they talked to Mr. Mussee and a participant observer telling them of plans to build a wire basin to hold salamanders. When asked why they had not been swimming with the others, Crane replied, 'When one of us doesn't do something, then none of us do it'.

Later in the study, under adult-constructed conditions, these boys assumed leadership positions again, but in competing teams consisting of prejudiced and violent members. An important point is that the three apparently got along very well with one another and with other groups when they were in their self-constructed group during this early phase of the experiment. Sherif apparently recognized the importance and strength of self-organized groups, because prior to his next step he 'anticipated that the split into two groups might not be taken easily by some of the boys' (1953: 247).

Sherif then separated the boys into two groups and placed the groups in separate cabins for Phase Two of the experiment. The campers were divided such that for each boy two-thirds of his initial friends were in the other bunkhouse. To ease the pain of this adult-determined division, the two groups were taken on 'activities which had first preference with most of the boys' (e.g. cook-outs with steaks broiled over open fires). Still, some were distressed by the adults' action (247):

adults. At the beginning of the three weeks they did *not* fight or prejudice among the groups which they themselves had constructed, although at times they played competitive games.

The Sherif site is comparable in important respects to the Asch (1952), experiments, which sought to demonstrate the negative influence of peer groups upon individuals. As is well known, Asch placed a group of college students in a room and projected upon a screen black lines of varied lengths. One of the lines was physically the shorter. Asch then asked each person which of the lines was the shorter, and consistently the students would name the line which was physically longer. Asch had hired 'confederates,' in order to determine whether or not the experimental student invited in each session would also verbalize the incorrect response. These experiments have been criticized, however, on the ground that a real peer group situation did not exist, but rather a peer group invaded by two authority-figures (the experimenters-professors), and that two thirds of the non-confederate students were *not* negatively influenced by the peer group (Embree, 1975; Orne, 1969).

The same sort of note applies to the Sherif site. Consider the situation: Summer camps are generally defined as places where games are played and skills are learned; one is invited to a summer camp; one is placed in groups in reverse of one's own friendship choices; one is told to compete and to win. Why would one *not* play the role assigned? It's all a game anyhow, and one came to the camp to play in the scripts set up by the adults (allegedly for one's own enjoyment). The kids were playing the parts assigned to them in the various plays set up by the adults. Perhaps they were following the scripts they perceived that the adults desired to have them act out. When the adults play the competition-games script, they do so complete with name calling, high energy desires to win, and so forth.

In contrast, consider a site (Glassner, 1976a), in which kids are not given scripts by adults, but only a stage upon which to build their own performances (as at the beginning of Sherif's study). This site was an elementary school playground, in which about 100 kids, mostly ages eight through ten, played unsupervised twice daily. Approximately half of the students were whites, half were blacks, half males and half females. They were from a variety of religious, socio-economic and neighborhood backgrounds. The kids divided each day into competing groups according to their skills, friendships, and the games they wanted to play. Frequently the groups would compete, but very seldom did name-calling or serious fighting occur. Rather, the kids worked off their needs or desires to fight through play fighting. Most of the time a group of kids was engaged in play fighting, but this was distinguished from real

persecution, primarily on the basis of intergroup religious conflicts.

The social science sites do not deal very often with such societies or groups. The uses of prejudice in intergroup conflict at the sites have sprung most often from economic competition. Our search for essential interactions of prejudice within intergroup conflicts will therefore concentrate upon the uses of prejudice in economic conflicts, but we will also bring out some uses in political, sexual, and religious conflicts.

Two related economic uses appear historically, as noted by key informant Jack Levin (1975): (1) for the maintenance of social class and status, and (2) for distribution of tasks considered unpleasant.

Maintenance of class Weber noted that status groups hold onto their prestige by allowing only their own offspring to adopt distinctive values and credentials. An effective way to maintain this system has been to justify exclusion of other groups via prejudicing. Several correlational sites suggest that this need not be limited to activity by a small elite. Simpson and Yinger (1972), note that a direct relationship appears between the occurrence of anti-immigration nativist activity and the incidence of economic depression. The Native American Party in the 1930s, the Know-Nothing Order in the 1950s, the American Protective Association in the 1880s and 1890s, and "one-hundred per cent American" groups in the 1930s all argued prejudice against recent immigrant groups to improve a shaky capitalistic economy. LaGumina (1973) reviewed the history of Italian-Americans and concluded that opposition to further immigration from Italy solidified during the depressions of 1893 and 1907. Dollard (1939), reported that white Southerns became more hostile toward Germans moving into their town as economic conditions worsened and competition for jobs increased.

When such prejudicing is felt to be needed it is constructed on bases similar to those Weber found elites using for their purposes of exclusion (Simpson and Yinger, 1972: 115):

> Racial differences or supposed differences, national, religious, cultural differences, or simply a general "inferiority" are the reasons ordinarily given to explain opposition to immigrants.

Sung (1961), reviewed stereotypes of Chinese-Americans during various periods of American history. Chinese immigrants in the 1800s tended to be regarded as honest, industrious, and peaceful. But when the job market tightened and the Chinese began to seek work in mines, farming, domestic services, and factories, new images emerged. They quickly became stereotyped as dangerous, deceitful, vicious, and clannish.

objectivity and impersonal dealings, and a certain amount of buyer-seller conflict. Park's example is the Metics in Athens. Other cases include Jews in the Middle Ages in Europe, East Indians in Burma, and several immigrant groups in the United States. These groups could be called directly exploited, whereas Japanese farmers mentioned in the last section were indirectly exploited. Park's work suggests that essential characteristics of directly exploited minorities may be their identifiability and powerlessness. Further research would be preferred before concluding that these features are essential, but our rounds to sites dealing with several of these minorities does recommend the possibility, as follows:

Indentifiability results from a property of the group (such as dialect or skin color) and from labeling by the majority groups. Powerlessness has tended to result from the numerically small size of the group. Numerical size certainly is not essential, however, as can easily be illustrated by the exploitation of female labor.

There is obviously a thin line between directly and indirectly exploited groups. Both must be identifiable and relatively powerless. Whether such groups become directly exploited or indirectly exploited seems to depend upon the needs of the exploiters, and these needs have varied results for the exploited. Jewish money-lenders in medieval Europe were thrust into the middle class, but Jews in Nazi Germany were murdered.

Why are groups used in one way or another? (What are the possible social uses for prejudices?)

The medieval Christian church viewed the lending of money for interest as sinful. Dimont (1962), argues that the dominant economic organizations necessitated the existence of money lenders, and rather than write off Christians from heaven, another strike against Jews' already impossible salvation was produced by placing them in money-lending positions.

Especially telling is Dollard's (1939), suggestion that these groups are placed in between masses and elites, and thereby receive the frustration-aggression of both groups. We can go beyond the psychological to see that such groups effectively inhibit social change which threatens elites. Massing (1949) documents the opportunistic policies of Bismarck and his elite during the late 1800's and early 1900s. When the elite's power was secure they discouraged anti-Semitism and even referred to it as 'a tool of the opposition.' But when worker groups began organizing, Bismarck and his colleagues employed anti-Semitism to divert the energies of the proletariat.

Numerous other cases could be described of using the public to help achieve role ascriptions to undesirable work positions. In each case the pattern is the same. An identifiable and powerless group is

of plantation owners and the potential indentured servants, the indentifiability criterion could not be adequately met.

A societal tool: how?

General entrenchment

We saw in the previous chapter that psychoanalytic sites such as Bettleheim and Janowitz (1964) attribute the often conflicting stereotypes in groups and societies to needs of ids, egos, and superegos. Hence, stereotypes such as sly, ambitious, and hyper-intelligent relate to superego projections, while those such as lazy, dirty, and over-sexed relate to the id projections. We noted that this type of response to Merton's puzzle concerning conflicting stereotypes points us in some social-psychological directions for an answer (even if we rejet psychoanalytic theory *per se*). Of course, stereotypes are more than projections of a prejudiced person's impulses. The impulses, targets, and attributes are significantly socially constructed and socially maintained. Examining how this is so will give us further understanding of the possibilities for prejudice's instrument-essence.

Prejudicing is intricately woven into society. We can understand this concretely by looking closely at case examples from key informant Jones (1972), of contemporary American institutions and the historical entrenchments from which prejudicing has emerged.

We discussed in the previous pages the entanglement of prejudice and economic competition. We can now specify how this entanglement leaves residual prejudice in social institutions, even years after the direct and prejudicing competition. Consider several examples.

1 Relatively few black families have been able to buy homes in the United States. They are discriminated against additionally by the tax structure, because home owners are permitted to deduct the interest payments on their mortgages from their taxable income. But even those blacks who are able to buy homes remain at a disadvantage. In Boston, for instance, the value assessment of houses in black neighborhoods was proportionately higher than in other areas. The average assessed property in black neighborhoods was declared to be approximately 56 per cent of the market value, in contrast to other areas of the city, where the assessed value averaged 28 per cent. Property taxes in Boston were $160 per thousand dollars of assessed value.

2 Targets who have been locked into the lower classes also receive discriminatory interest rates. Banks will seldom give loans to persons who cannot demonstrate membership in the middle class.

points. And their teachers perceived them as having a better chance of being successful later in life, as being happier, more curious, and more interesting than other children. Of course, expectations of target groups such as blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and women have frequently been low.

5 The legal institutions exhibit the entrenchment of prejudice as well. In major American cities the white population averages 65 per cent but produces 95 per cent of the police population. Conversely, the percentage of jail populations that are blacks is roughly ten times the percentage of blacks in the American population generally. A single story from Jones (1972: 142), based on *Boston Globe* accounts, offers some qualitative dimensions resulting within these statistics.

A 12-year-old black girl from Boston left at about 4.30 one afternoon to buy her mother a pie at the corner store. When she did not return by 5.30 her mother began looking for her in the neighborhood. At 8.30 p.m. she called the police. The police advised the mother that the daughter was probably visiting friends, to which the mother responded that her daughter never stayed away without permission.

The police never searched for the girl. A week and a half later they finally filed an official missing-person bulletin. The newspaper published a notice about the girl, but with a picture of the wrong girl. A tap was promised for the home telephone, in case a ransom call was received. The girl did call home at 7 a.m. one morning, sounding dazed and asking if her mother loved her, then hanging up. The mother immediately asked for a trace and was informed that no tap had been put on the telephone and no trace was possible. Two and a half weeks after she disappeared, the girl's body was found with a bullet in the head.

'Let's face it,' a telephone company official is quoted as saying, 'the wheel turned damned slowly in this case. It's not just the police. It's the double standard of our whole society. If a 12-year-old girl disappears on her way to buy a pie and she's white, the presumption is she's met foul play. If a little girl disappears on her way to buy a pie and she's black, everyone assumes she's just run away.'

Entrenchment in the justice institutions can also be seen in the ways some target persons come to spend their time behind bars. Black defendants raise bail money 38 per cent of the time, compared to white defendants' 57 per cent. This is due not only to social class differences, but also from consistently higher bail prices in predominately minority-processing courts.

The Sherman (1972), site notes institutional interconnections. White sharecroppers in the South are the most oppressed and poverty-stricken group in the region, except for black

'proof' that the prejudice is justified, therefore, is convincing only to a person who accepts the values of the dominant group as absolutely valid.

2 Reality is taken *as it* by the prejudiced person. He is scarcely interested in *why* minority groups are 'inferior', or his explanation is likely to be very simple – it is their nature.

MacIver (1948: 65), explains:

> Its peculiar property is that it takes the existence of one link in the circle as independently given, as a fact of nature or even as ordained by God, and concludes from the premise that the next link, the behavior predicted on the earlier link, is not prejudicial or discriminatory but a rational and proper response to the inferior capacities or qualities of the group subjected to it. Those who put forward the argument wilfully or blindly ignore the sector of the circle that lies on the other side to recognize that the conditions on which they base their argument arise out of, or are themselves sustained by, a prior process of discrimination.

Blaming the victim is unjustified. But it does indicate that entrenchment of prejudice in cultures results in observables for prejudiced persons to use. Knowledge of this permits us to move beyond the psychology or social psychology of prejudicing to search for where and how it is rooted in social worlds. Our discussion above indicates that prejudice and discrimination create some differences in target groups' own values and behaviors. These vary from high levels of individual achievement to self-doubt and frustration-aggression. They can also create intragroup conflict or in-group separatism. These creations appear to the prejudiced person to be the very reasons for his prejudice, and to be good, empirical reasons at that. Prejudiced persons exaggerate the differences and simplify the situations, permitting papers in journals with titles such as 'Abnormal and Social Psychology.' But such concerns are secondary to the processes of entrenchment of prejudice in societies in the first place. As far as the prejudiced person is concerned, the attributes he chooses of his targets in order to construct his prejudicing are simply out there, in objective reality. As we have seen, in some senses he is right. Some of our earlier discussions have suggested that identifiability may be essential to prejudicing. We may now add that this possibility may involve histories of the target characteristics by which the person or group is identified. We will consider identifiability again later in this chapter.

theoretician, argued that Indians lack rationality and morality and therefore must be controlled for everyone's good. When these theorists were answered by Alonzo de la Vera Cruz at the University of Mexico, the response was deportation of de la Vera Cruz to lower Yucatan.

These sixteenth century theories about Indians were only the ground work for the next two centuries of prejudice theories, which have become intricately woven into scientific and everyday thought. These culminated in Hume's probability theories, which provided an empirical ground for prejudice.

The sixteenth century theorists had depended upon Biblical explanations, which proved inadequate amid growing American "show-me" pragmatism requiring reliance upon current states, not upon distant and invisible pasts. The Europeans in America were encountering immediate problems staying alive and conquering one region after another. They needed their best European thinkers to provide immediate but well-defended theories to meet these needs.

The English invaders of the seventeenth century turned to John Locke. Locke had contended that everyone was created equal, and endowed with the natural rights of life, liberty and property. He had no difficulty, however, in dealing with the American Indians and Africans. He said the Indians and Africans were not properly using their land, and they had been captured in 'just wars,' and so could be enslaved. Locke drafted the Constitution for the Carolinas and was very influential in the emerging Degeneracy Theory.

During the eighteenth century a vast literature appeared on why blacks are black, why people speak different languages, and similar concerns. Montesquieu offered his climate theory in *De l'esprit des lois*. Linnaeus (1806), a founder of modern biology, divided men into 'wild men,' 'Indians,' 'Europeans,' 'Asiatics,' and 'Africans.' Among his descriptions of Africans are 'crafty,' 'indolent,' and 'negligent,' all of which have remained well entrenched throughout the next century and a half. He contended that the differences between groups was due to climate and social environment.

The climate theory encountered some difficulties. Enough Europeans had lived in Africa and America to discover firsthand that they were not changing as the result of climate. But biologist Buffon (1785) was already at work developing a more complete explanation. Buffon argued that 'white, then appears to be the primitive color of Nature,' and that climate, food, diseases, and modes of living changed some groups' color. He offered detailed comparisons of various groups. Among his descriptions which have remained entrenched in modern stereotyping are the Chinese as 'superstitious,' 'ceremonious,' and 'parasticial'; blacks as 'indolent' and 'stupid'; and American Indians as 'savage' and 'ignorant and

> men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, not even any individual eminent either in action or speculation . . . In Jamaica indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.

Hume was applying his method of historical experimental reasoning. First he alleged the historical fact that there never was a nonwhite civilization, while even the least cultured whites have been able to produce some kind of culture. Then the historical law governing the situation is offered: "Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men." (Hume was a good choice to run the English Colonial Office in 1766.)

One might expect that someone would accuse Hume of inadequate sampling. Actually, many of the most careful thinkers of the period lauded Hume's research and reasoning. Kant wrote (as quoted in Popkin, 1974):

> Mr Hume challenges anyone to cite an example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between the two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color.

Hume was answered on methodological and other grounds by James Beattie in his *Essay on the Origin and Immutability of Truth* in 1770. Beattie's work never gained the exposure that Hume's and Kant's did, however, and the latter were by far the more influential.

A generation of careful scientists emerged in the early 1800s to offer other sorts of empirical evidence for the polygenetic theories. Notable among these was Dr Samuel Morton, an ethnologist from Philadelphia. Morton collected skulls and measured their cranial capacity by filling them with pepper-seed, and then weighing the amount that could be fitted into each skull. His followers Gliddon, Nott and Agassiz followed suit. Their conclusions included: (1) that skull measurements and paintings in Egyptian tombs showed that racial characteristics of various groups have been the same

Identifiability

We may recommend identifiability now in light of the foregoing. In the previous chapter we offered some detail of the possibilities for prejudice inhering in the structure of Indo-European languages. On the basis of the Simpson and Yinger (1972), and Benedict (1940), sites we can now expand that analysis.

Race prejudice is most important in modern societies, but it has not always been, nor will it necessarily continue to be. Just a few centuries ago target groups in Europe were identified by religion in nearly all cases. There was relatively little contact in Europe with members of non-Caucasian races. Religion dominated the way of everyday thought and provided the rationale for considering certain target groups as outsiders. The medieval world considered life on earth as a brief second for those capable of eternal salvation. Prejudice and violence against Antichrists, who led thousands to damnation, were simply acts for the common good. As we would expect from our discussion thus far, such beliefs were entangled with other than religious institutions as well. 'Heresy hunting was profitable, and all those who sought riches and power eagerly took advantage of the opportunity, masking their satisfaction behind the dogma that the heretics were guilty of treason against the Almighty,' Ruth Benedict reminds us.

In a modern world dominated by science in both everyday thought and major institutions, the religious lines of demarcation virtually disappear. Prejudicing persons in relatively recent times have not identified their targets by claiming that they believe the wrong things, but by claiming that they are genetically inferior. This has been the case even for anti-Semitism. As late as 1899 Chamberlain declared in his *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* that Jews were enemies not because of their special ways of thinking and acting, but because 'one can very soon become a Jew' (as quoted in Popkin, 1974). But with Hitler anti-Semitism became fully biologized. Jews were held to be innately inferior and vicious, and a race to be destroyed.

The shift in prejudice against blacks is also illustrative. Europeans' first contacts with blacks and Orientals occurred at a time when religious differences were still considered most important. Talk was not of these groups' racial differences, but of their status as non-Christians (pagans). MacCrone (1937), found that the earliest practice of Europeans in South Africa was to free slaves who had been baptized. Such practices were inefficient, however, and by the 1670s a series of laws in the American colonies made it acceptable to keep a slave who had converted to Christianity (Elkins, 1959). As we saw above, the prejudicing persons turned to

attitudes expressed by children significantly correlated with those held by their parents.

But the verbalizing of an attitude by a child indicates only that the child knows what he is expected to say on a given subject, not that he believes it or even understands it. No sites I could locate offer longitudinal studies to determine whether or not the specific learned prejudices actually persist. We know from other areas of life that much of what is learned during socialization is later abandoned. Perhaps most importantly, persons learn prejudices in specific contexts, and the sites do not demonstrate whether persons consistently transfer the prejudices into other contexts.

Some sites indicate that the essential learning which occurs in prejudice-socialization is not of specific prejudices. Piaget (1947), demonstrated that children below the age of six or seven have not yet developed a conception of invariance of physical properties. This illustrates that a child's conceptual world is clearly different from that of an adult, and in the process of change. And just as the child has no conception of the invariance of physical objects, that child could be assumed to view people also as being impermanent.

Interviews by Radke, Trager and Davis (1949), reveal the fragility of the meaning of skin color to first and second graders. Among their statements:

> "Little boys when they get dirty get into a colored boy and when they get clean they get into a white boy."
>
> "When he gets dirty he turns into a colored boy."

Conversations at the Piaget and Weil (1951), site also reveal the confused status of categories for children. This seven-year-old is typical.

> Have you heard of Switzerland? *Yes.* What is it? *A canton.* And what is Geneva? *A town.* Where is Geneva? *In Switzerland.* (But the child draws two circles side by side.) Are you Swiss? *No, I'm Genevese.*

Many socializing agents take over by the time a child reaches age seven, and in contemporary societies these groups are not likely to present a single, consistent set of prejudices. Havinghurst (1975), notes that only about one-fourth of American children attend schools at which most of the other children are of the same social class. Peer groups tend to be quite important soon after children attend school, and these groups create their own norms and socialization priorities. Piaget (1965), reveals that the last half of elementary school is for most children a time when their own societies attain their maximum organization and codification. The several

apprehending essential relationships among the elements of the phenomena . . . remains important. It is not enough to discover and describe the components: rules regarding their possible combinations must also be defined.' The difficulty with considering our imagined offspring as prejudiced can be seen by looking beyond single essences. Even on the basis of our initial essential analyses we can note this difficulty. The offspring are stereotyping, but they apparently are not simplifying, nor are their actions apparently socially instrumental. Essential interactionist analyses can be especially useful in distinguishing between phenomena. Apparently what the offspring is doing is some sort of habitual reacting, rather than prejudicing. We would expect that other essences of prejudice also are missing within the actions of these offspring (though we have yet to uncover additional essences of prejudice).

Summary

Some central questions in this chapter are, 'Why is prejudice a social instrument,' and 'How is prejudice a social instrument.' Answers were offered by the sites in terms of (1) intergroup competition, (2) economic competition, (3) entrenchment in institutions, and (4) target characteristics.

An initial investigation concerned vertical and horizontal comparisons to the Sherif (1953 and 1961), sites. Sherif's suggestion that prejudice necessarily results from intergroup competition is not supported during such comparisons. This emerges in vertical comparisons in which low-prejudice was found in the early stages of Sherif's research (at which time the persons were permitted to form their own competitive groups) and horizontal comparisons to Asch, Glassner, Moreno and Criswell sites, each of which demonstrated that prejudice does not emerge from all intergroup conflict situations.

Most of the sociological sites deal with economic competition, and these are compared. The sites reveal that (1) use of prejudice within economic competition is not limited to elites; (2) powerful groups have the greatest opportunity to deploy prejudice as an instrument for simplifying economic competition; (3) frequent uses of prejudice in economic competition are for distribution of unpleasant work and the maintenance of social class and status; and (4) target groups selected must be identifiable.

The entrenchment of prejudice in societies was elaborated first through numerous sites which reveal the self-perpetuating nature of the chain: discrimination-support of stereotypes – justification for prejudice – further discrimination. This process is noted within economic, educational, and justice institutions.

8 Possible applications

I have suggested and partially elaborated four essences: instrumentality; simplification; identifiability; and that prejudicing must occur either by stereotyping, social distancing, simplified affect or a combination of these. The numerous rounds throughout the sites to elaborate these essences found no cases in which they were not present in some form. Hence, we are able to increase our confidence in the possibility that these are essences of prejudice. In Chapter 9 we will discuss further research necessary concerning these essences, but at least at this point we have established through a series of constant comparisons reasons to believe that these features are essential.

Now we begin to make use of our initial essences, even as we further elaborate them, through the critiques they suggest of other theories and researches, additional phantasy variations, and discussions of theoretical possibilities they may permit. These discussions and applications center around (1) a critique of functionalist claims that prejudice is 'functional for the minority group,' (2) the possibility for prejudice in classless societies, (3) the normality of prejudice, (4) whether or not our suggested essences distinguish prejudice from other phenomena, and (5) possibilities for new configurations of essences of prejudice.

Critiques of a functionalist proposal

It should be clear by now that several functionalists' sites have been very useful in our inquiry. I would present an incomplete report of our first experiment were I to neglect problematic aspects of functionalist sites, however. These problems stem from functionalism's organic analogy (critiqued in Glassner and Freedman, 1979), which in one group of sites is so deeply interwoven

life histories of white students and to gear instructional material and IQ and other tracking materials to whites (e.g., Blauner, 1972 and Jones, 1972).

To support conclusions such as Frazier's, Howard (1966) interviewed 100 black physicians, dentists, lawyers, and teachers regarding their attitudes toward competition with whites. He sought their agreement or disagreement with hypothetical situations such as the following (1966: 23):

> Dr J., who is a white physician, opened an office in an all-Negro neighborhood about 6 months ago. Recently, he advised a white physician friend to open an office in the same neighborhood. The white friend decided to open the office. Negro physicians in the neighborhood heard about the decision of Dr J's friend and urged him not to open the office. They advised him on several desirable locations in all-white neighborhoods. How do you feel about the advice of the Negro physicians?

On the basis of responses Howard concludes that black professionals are only in slight agreement with competition with whites. Howard calls this 'the Negro dilemma': a commitment to the goal of free competition and concurrently a social interest in segregation which inhibits their approval of such competition.

We require only a simple phantasy variation to see that such inductions by social scientists reveal more about the potential blindness of functionalism than about prejudices or ethnic relations. Which group of doctors *does* support competition? Attempts to lift the ban on physician advertising, or to radically increase the number of positions in medical schools, have consistently been defeated. For Howard's research to become meaningful the same question would have to be asked of physicians generally. Or to be more accurate – white physicians should be given a scenario such as the following:

> Dr J., a well respected physician, opened an office in a neighborhood about 6 months ago. Recently, he advised another well respected physician to open an office in the same neighborhood. The friend decided to open the office. Less famous physicians in the neighborhood heard about the decision of Dr J's friend and urged him not to open the office. They advised him on several desirable locations in other neighborhoods. How do you feel about the advice of these less prominent physicians?

Until the advent of black pride campaigns in some black communities, the white physician probably would have been better respected than the black physician and for good reason. More

individual targets or against the original prejudicing groups they must be able to meet the following conditions which apply to any prejudiced person's or group's (A) profitable use of prejudice against any target (B): (1) A must be more powerful than B in the areas of social life to which prejudice will be applied; (2) A must intentionally simplify this area of social life; (3) A must have ability in at least one method of prejudicing; and (4) B must be identifiable by A.

These are our first essential conditions, and they arise from internal determiners of prejudice noted thus far – its instrumental and simplification essences. In order for a person or group successfully to use an instrument, they must be able to identify that upon which the instrument will be used, they must be more powerful than their target, and they must know how to use the instrument. Since prejudice is an instrument for simplification, it must be used to that end in some sense.

These points require a few additional comments. It might be argued that just as a hammer can be used either for driving a nail into a wall or for killing a cat, is it not the case that prejudice can be used to ends other than simplification? Our reply is that the two uses of the hammer are two separate possibilities within the range of possibilities for its striking-instrument essence. Comparably, prejudice may be used to simplify a range of possible groups or phenomena. It must be recalled that we are speaking of essential conditions for successful use of prejudice. A hammer cannot be deployed as a hammer without striking it against another object (e.g. hammers cannot be successfully deployed for sawing wood, but can be used to similar ends by breaking the wood).

Similar questions could be raised about the other conditions. Cannot one use a hammer without knowing how to use it? Are not such instruments sometimes used successfully by weak persons against strong persons or objects? In all cases our reply must be of the same order as the above. One need not have had specific instruction in the use of hammers in order to successfully use a hammer, but one must have ability at striking one object with another. And the second question can be interpreted only to describe apparent, not actual, strength. The strongest of two entities in any given battle is the one which is actually capable of winning. Although A may have fewer weapons that B, it is the stronger if what is consequential for winning is creative use of weapons, effective vehicles for transportation, or some other criteria in addition to number of weapons.

These objections notwithstanding, we can apply the above to the functionalist claim. American blacks do not command greater resources than do dominant white groups. Blacks are divided

ations, to distinctive mannerisms attributed to gays, to genetic determinisms argued by heterosexuals.

My argument might be answered by the phantasy variation of some Marxists along the lines that once economic classlessness entrenched itself in the society, other distinctions would also disappear or at least become incapable of providing greater social resources to one group than to another. I would welcome such a variation, but I have been unable to build one which demonstrates the essential possibility of each step in the change. For instance, the logic of a single social class would certainly not obviate a logic of singular sexual orientation, which could be encouraged through prejudicing against bisexuals or homosexuals.

Normality of prejudice

The discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 permits a potentially significant theoretical insight concerning the essential possibilities for prejudice interrelating with other phenomena of social consciousness or personality.

Authoritarian personality research and frustration-aggression research in a general way, want to hold that prejudice is part of a configuration of interrelated personality characteristics. We have concluded on the basis of vertical comparisons within the *Authoritarian Personality* site and horizontal comparisons with other sites that the personality type described by Adorno *et al.* is not essential for prejudicing. A phantasy variation further suggests that it may even be improbable under certain conditions. This variation is of the several sites noted by Simpson and Yinger (1972: Chapter 5), which suggests that the overall level of negative stereotypes about minority groups has been steadily decreasing in the United States over the last five decades. Various reasons are offered, ranging from the spread of social science to a simple change in verbal conventions. The point is that *Authoritarian Personality* employs agreement with stereotypes as its chief measure of prejudice and correlates this with political, moralistic, and other belief-agreements. When persons consider it unattractive, economically unwise, etc. to express stereotypes, they can stop such acceptance. The same can be imagined for items from the fascism scale such as, 'Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places.' Or we can imagine persons who find it to their advantage to accept stereotypes about minorities while rejecting the 'fascism' items. More concretely, sites such as Rokeach (1960), have demonstrated that anti-Semitism and fascism can be found among radicals and liberals, as well as among conservatives such as those Adorno *et al.* questioned. Persons' prejudicing does not seem to

at grocery stores. Nor would we criticize someone for the stereotypes that 'All red lights mean stop' or 'All check-out clerks deal with money.'

A picture begins to emerge, then, of the normalcy of ways of prejudicing within the larger structures of social consciousness. Similarly, we have seen that the suggested essences 'instrumental' and 'simplification' are properties of other social phenomena as well as of prejudice.

Essences of prejudice as general essences

Our discussion above, along with several others concerning entrenchment of prejudice and social control of the social-psychology of prejudicing, have placed prejudice back in its societal context (from which it is frequently removed by those who wish to study it in itself).

As noted in the Preface, my goal is not simply to understand prejudice as a social phenomenon, but to be able to change social interactions in ways which diminish the undesirable products of prejudiced interactions. To accomplish this one must be able to distinguish prejudice from other social phenomena, while still recognizing its entrenchment in societies. To the limited extent possible on the basis of our first experiment with the method, I begin now to distinguish prejudice as a phenomenon by examining for which ends it can be instrumental.

We suggested at several points in Chapters 3 and 4 that separate social phenomena often share common essences, and that an essence can be investigated by looking at how it exists in other phenomena. We can step back now from the prejudice sites and see simplification in other situations. Such a search leads to an essential insight which is an important corrective to several sites' proposals for reducing prejudice by reducing simplification. Those who suggest that greater education or more scientific thinking in everyday life will reduce prejudice ignore that simplification is a positively valued goal of many endeavors. Simplification itself is not something that we would want to universally prescribe.

Two proposed prejudice-reduction agencies, education and science, themselves strive for simplification. A general goal of education is to place experience into simplified categories (to make sense out of nature, art, human behavior, etc.). Simplification is a goal of science as well, though not necessarily an essence thereof. Simplicity is frequently said to be a desirable characteristic of concepts, laws and theories in science (Rudner, 1966).

It is not the case that we want to deal with the social problem of

> There are some interesting changes in stereotypes as one progresses from the more to the less anti-Semitic. Those who are rated [highest] for anti-Semitism are most inclined to accuse Jews of the more heinous crimes, of being firebugs, swindlers, warmongers, and traitors. They also state that Jews have too much political and economic power, occupy the best houses, are lazy, cowardly, selfish, and (surprisingly) great lovers of poultry . . .
>
> [Less anti-Semitic persons] are reasonable in the sense that some people (both Jewish and gentile) could easily be found to whom many of these descriptions would apply. Taken individually they are well within the range of experience of the ordinary man and they lack the air of extravagant phantasy typical of the plottings and high life described [above].

Several difficulties present themselves from Robb's analysis, despite its 'grain of truth.' Is it not also true that 'some people (both Jewish and Gentile) could be found . . . who are selfish, lazy, and warmongers?' What makes these more serious accusations than those of the 'less anti-Semitic' statements?

Difficulties with any continuum solution to the simplification problem appear to be the relative nature of continua themselves, and dealing with middle grounds on any continuum. Although the words may be the same, a stereotype in one time, place, and group may be strong and elsewhere it may be weak. Calling a group of persons by any stereotype can be a compliment or an insult, depending upon the group members' self perceptions and definitions, the use to which this stereotyping is being put by the prejudiced, the social events during which the stereotyping occurs, and so forth.

Another possibility for distinguishing simplification in prejudice from other sorts of simplification appears in Hesse's (1967) work reviewing philosophers' of science attempts to define what would constitute adequate simplification. Currently posited as the most nearly adequate is Goodman's proposal that complexity depends on the principle that if every set of predicates of one kind is replaceable by some set of predicates of another kind, then the first cannot be more complex than the second. In short, a set of predicates which is always replaceable is simpler than that by which it is replaced.

Viewed from this perspective, our example above might be seen as a case in which attempted simplification actually results in greater complexity. Stereotyping Mexicans as lazy may initially simplify reactions to Mexicans. But since Mexicans exist who are not lazy, it could be argued that 'Mexicans are lazy' results in greater complexity, rather than in simplification. When the [illegible]

were not socially instrumental. Musicians emerge who compose music 'for its own sake' or for their own pleasure, rather than to facilitate social relations. This is not to deny that jazz was born out of the social interactions of status-anxious blacks in New Orleans (as Walton, 1972 notes), nor that most music is intended at the least as an instrument for group entertainment. But clearly we cannot include either simplification or instrumental as essences of music.

Where one of the essences of prejudice apparently *is* shared by another social phenomenon, it may still be possible to distinguish that phenomenon in its current state from prejudice. Both sciences and education do seem to share the instrumental essence with prejudice. An important point here is one we noted in the methodology section, of the necessity to examine relationships between essences as well as essences themselves if we are to understand a social phenomenon. On the basis of what we know from our initial investigations we can see that prejudice is an instrument for simplification. On the other hand, science, education, and music are not necessarily instruments for simplification, but may be instruments for deriving beauty, for increasing understanding, 'for their own sake,' etc. – none of which appear to be possibilities for uses of prejudice. Furthermore, even in cases where one of these social phenomena is being used as an instrument for simplification, it can be distinguished from prejudice if its ways of accomplishing the simplification do not rely upon stereotyping, simplified behavior intentions, or simplified affect.

Another major distinction is between the goals of persons who construct social phenomena. Thus, Frank (1957: 356) noted of contemporary scientists:

> This metaphysical concept of a true theory as a "replica of physical reality" is not prevalent in the scientific philosophy of today. A theory is now rather regarded as an instrument that serves some definite purpose. It must be helpful in predicting future observable facts on the basis of facts that have been observed in the past and in the present. The theory should also be helpful in the contribution of devices which can save us time and labor. The scientific theory is, in a way, a tool that produces other tools according to a practical scheme. Scientific theories are also accepted, however, because they give us a simple and beautiful world picture and support a philosophy which, in turn, supports a desirable way of life.

A criticism of our argument must be considered as well, however. It might be that instrumentality and simplification are essences of any language usage. Language is said to be necessarily simplifying, instrumental, and instrumental for simplification.

joining together with other essences, and disjoining from other essences. We have excluded on practical grounds the passing away option. Hence any solutions for reducing prejudice which would make sense within our essential interactionist theory must concern new configurations of essences.

Considerations of induction offer examples of possibilities for new essence configurations. This is precisely the attempt which is being made by those philosophers who are most successfully tackling the difficulties of induction. Their arguments are beyond the scope of the present work, but a cursory introduction to a couple of the major works should illustrate the point. Both Goodman and Pierce have suggested ways in which induction can be brought into new configurations with other essences to accomplish science.

Goodman's (especially 1955), greatly elaborated theory attempts to solve his 'new riddle of induction' by arguing that the better-entrenched predicates are to be preferred over less-entrenched predicates. Degree of entrenchment of predicates for Goodman is basically determined by whether or not the predicate has been employed successfully many, few or no times in the past. Although in his emerald example noted in Chapter 6 there is equal evidence for 'grue' as for 'green', 'grue' has been much less frequently employed than other predicates in the cases of correct predictions. Entrenchment also depends upon how important in light of the rest of one's system of thought the predicate turns out to be. A variation of this type of induction strategy might preclude stereotyping as induction. The specific stereotype may be important to the prejudicing person or group, who may have used it frequently in the past. But it seems doubtful that prejudiced persons would use this variety of predicates in same-order situations from other parts of their lives. For example, rules for inductions used for stereotyping a target probably are not used for conducting inductions concerning friends, sales persons, business associates, etc. Whatever justifications make it possible for 'all A to be B' when one is prejudicing are unlikely to be the same justifications which make B's of A's in other areas of one's life.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a very generalized [illegible] possibilities for theory construction and application [illegible] elaboration achieved of an essential interactionist theory of prejudice.

Treating our suggested essences as if they were in fact essences of prejudice we critiqued the functionalist notion of 'functions of prejudice for the minority group' and indicated that the ways of

9 Assessment and further development

The preceding chapters have presented an initial illustration of one methodological strategy for essential interactionist research into large social phenomena which have been widely researched from other perspectives. A major goal has been to uncover some of the strengths and limitations of the method.

Much potential for developing a method exists within analysis of the incompleteness and inadequacies revealed by its early applications. This concluding chapter assesses the method in light of the fieldwork and the analysis it permitted. The assessment is in two parts: first, a listing of points noted during the illustration, which further specify what was said in Part II; and second, a series of recommendations for changes and additions which seem needed if the method is to permit thorough application.

Methodological notes from the first illustration

1 The literature sites proved to be rich sources of material for (a) suggesting essences, (b) elaborating these, and (c) critiquing previous research and theorizing. Each of these provide higher levels of generality about the phenomenon.

(a) The capacity for suggesting essences was anticipated in our discussion in Part II and is demonstrated both in the initial work with definitions from the sites and in the additional essences which were suggested during rounds through the sites.

(b) The elaboration of suggested essences illustrates an unique potential for the method and also an inadequacy. Unlike survey research or traditional participant observation, the literature sites *en masse* provided tremendous detail about the phenomenon as seen in a variety of historical periods, distinct settings, and a variety of methodological and theoretical lenses. The point is exemplified

was illustrated in vertical comparisons of the Sherif site and of *Authoritarian Personality*. But in general, these literature sites do not contain enough information about how they were constructed to permit vertical comparisons. One needs tremendous detail about the decision-making processes by those who wrote the site and about actions at every step in the research process.

(c) Under-utilization of phantasy variations is also regrettable. This technique permits direct examination of the logic inherent in suggesting the essences which we propose or their configurations, and possible validation of discoveries. Phantasy variations are especially important for elaborating one sort of essence, the metaphorical. Quite clearly instrumentality is a metaphor.

Metaphors have offered much to the arts and sciences for understanding phenomena. Many apparently discrete entities share features in common, and the metaphor helps us to make these connections. Rashevsky (1961) notes examples of the use of analogies between the heart and vascular system and pumps and systems of pipes, with resulting discoveries of expressions between the mass of the heart, the heart frequency, and total mass of the animal. The relative power of various metaphors depends upon the degree of isomorphism between the items. An excellent way to further elaborate a metaphor is through determining which items within a group serve best for the analogy.

In our case, elaboration of the instrumental essence requires determination through systematic variations of which tool is most nearly isomorphic with prejudicing. Once this is determined a great specificity about instrumentality within prejudice should be possible. (This potential was illustrated even by our inadequate analogies during the first illustration between prejudice-use and hammer-use.)

Greer (1969: 148) noted dangers in the ways we have been using metaphors:

> You are apt to take them for granted and fail even to recognize them as metaphors. Then you adopt the metaphors given by the conventions of thought in your discipline or by common sense. Thus the phrases, 'the political game,' 'the social body,' 'the climate of opinion,' 'the military machine.' These are commonplace shifts of meaning from folk toward technical language. But guiding metaphors are powerful limits and directives for resulting theories. They highlight that which conforms, and they suppress 'irrelevant' aspects; they can lead to a kind of theoretical 'tunnel vision.'

4 A distinction must be spelled out between illustration of the method and definitive results from the method. Only the former has

essential configurations.

(c) Goodman's conditions for revocability noted in Chapter 4 can be considered only after the configurations of essences have been suggested. At that point we must ask whether the essences and their configurations as we have proposed them meet the conditions of workability and compatibility. We achieve essential possibilities ('defended results') through our research only when we can argue that our essential interactionist statements work under the variety of manifestations of the phenomenon and are compatible with one another. At this point we have built a qualitative system upon an essential interactionist ontology.

5 Several indications exist for the potential for social policy development on the basis of essential interactionist inquiries and their resulting systems. In the previous chapter we already began to specify the essential conditions for successful prejudicing, and these conditions can be manipulated through policy or social movement work. Our elaboration of the tendency of intellectuals to reply to prejudicing with more prejudicing indicates that one may require an essential analysis to avoid this trap. Finally, combat strategies for target groups can be derived through evaluations of which parts of the essential configurations of prejudicing that targets can change.

Next steps

> There are very many different equally true descriptions of the world, and their truth is the only standard of their faithfulness. And when we say of them that they all involve conventionalizations, we are saying that no one of these different descriptions is *exclusively* true, since the others are also true. None of them tells us *the* way the world is, but each of them tells us *a* way the world is (Goodman, 1972: 31).

Rather than stick to an assessment only of our initial experiment, I wish to conclude with suggestions for the additional research which would be needed to develop a full essential interactionist theory of prejudice.

Obviously, the next steps require first off some elaborations of the other suggested essences revealed in Chapter 8: pre-judging, towards others, and self-other splits. That elaboration of these possible essences is likely to reveal rich material for the theory is already evident:

A phantasy variation in my fieldnotes links the suggested self-other essence with the instrumental essence. This variation looks at a variety of uses of instruments and concludes that they are all used

1 I frequently moved to other types of literature sites. Sites written by historians were frequently employed; work by philosophers dominated much of the discussion on simplification and on stereotypes-as-inductions; and some novels were noted.
2 Discussion of entrenchment of prejudice in institutions and of prejudice as a social instrument revealed that the sociological literature was limited almost exclusively to sites dealing with economic entrenchment and use. Sites primarily concerned with gender, family, and politics were rare, although some phantasy variations revealed the need for such considerations. As a result, virtually all of the sites dealt with prejudices against ethnic groups, to the exclusion of prejudices against women, gays and others.
3 The need for cross-cultural sites emerges from our discussion of the ways in which Indo-European languages facilitate stereotyping. Does stereotyping exist amid other types of languages? If not, perhaps this major way of prejudicing is replaced by another, which would revise our essentialist statements about ways of prejudicing. The concern about possible economic bases of prejudice also may be better understood via cross-cultural sites.
4 The social science sites typically ask 'why' questions, and we have argued that 'how' questions are also important for understanding of phenomena. Sites by philosophers, ethnographers, and prejudicing persons themselves often address 'how' questions.

Filling out of literature sites is accomplished much the way we sought social science sites in Chapter 5. One begins with card catalogues and abstracting sources, then goes through the references found in the works listed. This creates a spiral of references leading to sites. For literature sites such as novels, diaries and autobiographies this may not work quite as well, however. In such cases it may be necessary to interview persons who are familiar with such sites.

In addition, one may need to manufacture sites. My travels through the literature sites have revealed that three groups construct prejudice in societies: the prejudiced, the targets, and those who study prejudice. By completing the sites lists as specified above, the third group will be thoroughly researched. And as argued in Chapter 4 and illustrated throughout the current Part, much will be gained from these researchers concerning construction of prejudice by the prejudicing and by the targets. A theory derived strictly from these sites would be far better grounded and predictive amid various manifestations of the phenomenon than any previous

as Guskin (1962), Karlins (1969), Selzer (1972), and Bayton (1956), that answers to 'how people stereotype' must be given in object-dependent terms. A full theory of prejudice must investigate how targets construct their cues, as well as how they construct others' prejudicing.

In addition, we need to answer a question remaining from the previous chapter concerning claims that 'prejudice is functional for minority groups.' Despite the critique noted in that discussion, are there ways in which prejudice becomes instrumental for targets? Or put more generally, in what ways do targets themselves construct their own prejudicing?

In short, any adequate essential interactionist theory of prejudice must make constant comparisons and variations concerning the 'modes of appearing' (Spiegelberg, 1965), of prejudice. On the basis of our research thus far we can see that prejudice exists as my prejudice or another's, and in each case is directed in various degrees and angles toward me, away from me, by me, by others, and in varying grades of visibility and clearness.

By filling out the literature sites in the ways proposed above, we should produce a list of sites that reveal the angles of prejudice needed for an adequate theory. Of the two missing angles noted above, diaries, autobiographies, novels, and ethnographies may well give a rich understanding of the nonintentionality of prejudicing and of constructions by targets. But what can one do if the existing sites do *not* provide a needed perspective?

Let us conclude with general suggestions for a way to manufacture new literature sites, should this become necessary after the existing sites have been employed. At that point, of course, one would have fairly precise notions about the missing angles, and the manufacture of additional sites would be accomplished with these objectives in mind.

The manufacture of additional literature sites can occur in certain cases through the researcher's attempts to accomplish the phenomenon. This is a fundamental goal of ethnomethodologists, who claim that any researcher 'by having to perform in (another's) world, must develop and adopt the perspective that goes with that world' (Psathas, 1968: 519). I would argue that being able to do whatever one is studying is not as instructive as such ethnomethodologists claim. It can be the case that persons who accomplish something accomplish only those aspects of the process which gives the behavioral appearance of 'doing it right,' without necessarily thinking in the ways their 'subjects' think or going through the same decision making steps. And we frequently perform roles in detached manners, without adopting them or even accepting that 'I' am doing the role.

researcher should these be needed to provide perspectives missing from existing literature sites.

The precise form that the method takes will vary according to the phenomenon studied. I have concentrated upon describing the steps which would be used in researching prejudice. But the general methodological strategy should be applicable to research concerning a variety of large social phenomena about which much has been written in the past. In each case one would do well to begin by mapping, comparing and varying literature sites relating to as many groups as one can identify who are involved in constructing the phenomenon, with the goal of suggesting and elaborating essences of the phenomenon. If inadequacies are discovered in such sites, one fills in with additional sites, which are then compared in the same manner. When one is unable to elaborate further the suggested essences of the phenomenon, one compares the sites again to determine the essential configurations of essences within the phenomenon. Once this is accomplished one should be able to talk not only about necessary conditions (as in discussions of individual essences) but also about sufficient conditions for the existence of the phenomenon. The final statements should be of the variety, 'Essences E_1 though E_n in interactions I_1 through I_n permit phenomenon P in any of its manifestations.'

This type of understanding has frequently been missing within sociology and is desperately needed if we are to avoid talking past one another and producing laws about relationships between entities which we do not understand.

Notes: Stereotyping seems to be the way of prejudicing here. Jones (173) gives similar report, but perhaps from his own black perspective adds that Sherifs' 'subjects' were 'white boys from very similar backgrounds.' This could be important.

Also, this seems to be requiring a vertical comparison: how did Sherif come to do this study? Why set it up as an experiment instead of P–O? (*He* designed the situation, not the boys, or so it sounds.)

Book usually cited by Sherif describing the case is *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (1953). He also summarizes in *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation* (1961), and in *In Common Predicament* (1966), as well as in some of the general social psych and intergroup conflict books.

From the books generally, a reconstruction:

He set out to conduct 'a sociological experiment' to examine in-group friendships, intergroup conflict, prejudice and conflict reduction via situations constructed and controlled by the experimenters. He notes often his concern that the thing be controlled, that it resemble a lab experiment. Of his major concerns, I note from his earlier books that his previous interest apparently centered on group norms.

In 1953, he took twenty-four 11- and 12-year-old boys to Robber's Cave, Okla. Turns out they were white Protestant boys from similar middle-class neighborhoods in New Haven. (Check later horizontally: any similar studies using other background kids, or using adults?)

Sherif described the experiment in most detail in Chapter 9 of *Harmony and Tension*. He begins by stressing, 'Findings on group formation stress that the content of the individual member's major attitudes toward the group is derived from the social norms of the group. These norms are internalized by the individual members (229).' Talks a lot about importance of the group structure on roles and norms that emerge. Describes the 3 states of the experiment.

1 Informal groupings on basis of personal inclinations and interests. All activities were camp-wide, with freedom of choice and 'mixing'. 'Thus it became possible to single out budding friendship groups and, more or less, to equate the weights of such personal factors in the two experimental groups of State II. (239).' *Note*: for Sherif, the entire purpose of Stage I was to prepare to accomplish Stage 2.

2 Formation of in-groups, with activities planned according to favorites of the boys themselves. This was when the boys were separated into 2 groups opposite of their choices in Stage 1. And 'all rewards given in this period were made on a group-unit basis, not to particular individuals.'

Notes

Chapter 1 Causation and interaction

1 To consider the myriad alternative causal notions of philosophers of science (cf. Ayer, 1951; Collingwood, 1940; Sosa, 1975; and Von Wright, 1974) would not be germane to this discussion, which is preparatory to a particular proposal to sophisticate the vocabulary of determinism in sociology. It may be possible to sophisticate causal sociology as well, notably through nomic linguistic products and through state descriptions of productive systems, but this project I entrust to the sociological causalists themselves.

2 Interactionist positions would explain this example as a case for the position that neural activities interact with other physical activities and with social activities. The 'results' or 'effects' are points within the interaction process at which one group of interactions appears to end.

3 Another way the process of elimination argument is phrased is in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This argument holds that if A is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of B, then A causes B. The inadequacy of this position is that one can easily imagine constant conjunctions in which both parts are necessary and sufficient for each other, hence, how can one attribute causation to one member and not to the other? The simple example of my current writing activity is one in which the motion of my hand is necessary and sufficient for the motion of the pencil, but the motion of the pencil is also necessary and sufficient for the motion of the hand. Neither the hand nor the pencil can move under the circumstances of my holding the pen in writing position without the other moving with it (R. Taylor, 1967: 65–6).

4 Nothing within this argument for the primacy of action refutes Hume (Von Wright, 1971: 190–1):

> To say that things 'bring about' other things is . . . misleading. this 'bringing about' is nothing but regular sequence. Our knowledge that

the major substantive areas within sociology as phenomena. Medicine, education, deviance, etc. could profit from analyses of the essences of these areas of social worlds. Such analyses could provide grounding for discussions and research in these areas, and might decrease the extent to which researchers and theorists are able to talk past one another. Essential interactionist analyses might also make better sense of the existing disparate literature in the fields (as I hope to do in the following chapters concerning prejudice).

Another important need for essential interactionist methods and inquiries is within existing theories. Such essential interactionist work could investigate the grounding for theoretical positions with the goal of revealing the essential natures of the theories. Or essential interactionist analyses might profitably be conducted on social theory as a phenomenon, to offer necessary and immutable common bases for social theorizing (or to determine whether such bases exist).

Chapter 3 General considerations

1 This paragraph accepts Kockelmans' (1967) analysis.
2 A notable exception is Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry' in *Crisis*.
3 Among the best general introductions to phenomenology are Kockelmans (1967), Zaner (1970), and Husserl's *Ideas* and *Crisis*.
4 The modern demand is 'observability.' For interesting discussions see Scheffler (1963), Achinstein (1968), Goodman (1951), and Hanson (1971). The positivists' observability demand is better disguised but no less absurd than if they exclaimed: 'We have stopped hearing and smelling for the sake of limiting ourselves to scientific observability.' From another angle the observability demand can be seen as similar to a request that we all become the individuals at the party who stand in the corner watching everyone else but never participate ourselves. A party made up solely of such people would no longer be an activity that merits wakefulness.
5 It is apparent that this conception is similar to Kant's *a priorie* of human reason and to much of Descartes' work, and Husserl admitted as much. I cannot help but wonder whether such similarity is not itself supporting evidence for the thesis.
6 Note also Santayana's (1927: 36), remark: 'Every essence is universal not because there are repeated manifestations of it (for there need be no manifestations at all) but because it is individuated internally by its character, not externally by its position in the flux of nature: and no essence is general for the same reason.' See also Runder's (1966), critique of Weber's ideal types.
7 The following discussion is based upon the interchange between Chisholm (1973 and 1975), and Plantinga (1975).
8 See also Santayana (1927), especially the postscript, for discussions of the inevitability of essence analysis even by those persons who disclaim essentialism.
9 My discussion of operationalism relies upon Strasser (1974: Chapter 2).

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